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Preparing for Disaster:  Protecting 
the Most Vulnerable in Emergencies 
Sharona Hoffman∗ 
Many federal, state, local, and private entities are investing significant 
resources in disaster readiness initiatives.  Often disregarded in these 
initiatives, however, are the special needs of vulnerable populations during 
disasters.  In the context of emergencies, vulnerable groups may include 
individuals with disabilities, pregnant women, children, elderly persons, 
prisoners, certain members of ethnic minorities, people with language 
barriers, and the impoverished.  The fate of the disadvantaged during 
disasters has received little attention in the legal literature, and this 
Article begins to fill that gap.  Through an examination of normative 
distributive justice arguments, existing federal and state civil rights 
provisions, and emergency response laws, it argues that existing legal and 
ethical frameworks entitle vulnerable populations to significant protection.  
It also, however, highlights the shortcomings of the current statutory 
scheme as it relates to the needs of the disadvantaged during disasters and 
urges legislators to supplement these laws with additional requirements.  
Moreover, the Article argues that for vulnerable populations, successful 
disaster response is dependent upon careful planning.  With this in mind, 
the Article develops a proposal for statutory provisions that will mandate 
adequate preparation to safeguard the welfare of the vulnerable in 
emergencies. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Preparing for disasters has been high on the agendas of many 
federal, state, local, and private entities for several years.1  For 
example, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”) and 
state public health departments are undertaking major emergency 
planning initiatives, including extensive training and educational 
programs.2  Several recent governmental reports and statements also 
address emergency readiness in the United States.3  The federal 
government has spent over $10 billion on emergency preparedness 
activities since 2001.4 
These efforts, however, often disregard the special needs of 
vulnerable populations.  During and after a catastrophic event, 
vulnerable populations may include individuals with disabilities, 
pregnant women, children, the elderly, prisoners, ethnic minorities, 
people with language barriers, and the impoverished.5  A review of 
 1 Dennis P. Andrulis et al., Preparing Racially and Ethnically Diverse Communities 
for Public Health Emergencies, 26 HEALTH AFF. 1269, 1269 (2007) (“The White House, 
Congress, and State and local governments have made emergency preparedness one of 
their highest priorities.”); Aaron Katz et al., Preparing for the Unknown, Responding to 
the Known:  Communities and Public Health Preparedness, 25 HEALTH AFF. 946, 946 
(2006) (finding that “bioterrorism preparedness remains a high priority for federal, 
state, and local governments” and that “the capabilities of local public health and 
emergency response agencies” had improved significantly since 2004). 
 2 See Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 
2002, 42 U.S.C. § 247d-4(a)(3) (2006) (providing that “Secretary shall expand, 
enhance, and improve the capabilities of the  Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention relating to [public health emergency] preparedness”); see also Pandemic 
and All-Hazards Preparedness Act of 2006, 42 U.S.C. § 247d-3a (2006) (establishing 
grants for state and local governments to undertake activities designed to enhance 
public health emergency preparedness); Centers for Disease Control & Prevention, 
Public Health Law Program, http://www2a.cdc.gov/phlp/about.asp (last visited Feb. 
19, 2009) (describing emergency preparedness activities of CDC’s Public Health Law 
Program); Washington State Department of Health, Public Health Emergency 
Preparedness and Response Preparedness:  Information for Local Health Agencies and 
Health Care Providers, http://www.doh.wa.gov/phepr/pheprlho.htm (last visited Feb. 
19, 2009). 
 3 See generally DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., FEMA’S 
PREPAREDNESS FOR THE NEXT CATASTROPHIC DISASTER (2008), available at http:// 
www.dhs.gov/xoig/assets/mgmtrpts/OIG_08-34_Mar08.pdf; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY 
OFFICE, EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT:  OBSERVATIONS ON DHS’S PREPAREDNESS FOR 
CATASTROPHIC DISASTERS  (2008) (statement of William O. Jenkins, Jr., Dir. Homeland Sec. 
& Justice), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08868t.pdf.  
 4 Rebecca Katz & Jeffrey Levi, Should a Reformed System Be Prepared for Public 
Health Emergencies, and What Does That Mean Anyway?, 36 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 716, 
717 (2008). 
 5 ASS’N OF STATE & TERRITORIAL HEALTH OFFICIALS, DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN 
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thirty-seven national pandemic preparedness plans from Europe, Asia 
and the Pacific Rim, the Middle East, Africa, and the Americas 
revealed that “none of the plans suggested any systematic attempt to 
identify” disadvantaged groups.6  Furthermore, fewer than twenty-five 
plans considered the needs of “one or more economically or socially 
disadvantaged group[s].”7 
Inadequate preparation for the needs of vulnerable populations can 
lead to catastrophic consequences.  The disadvantaged could suffer 
large death tolls, as illustrated by Hurricane Katrina, in which over 
1,800 individuals died because they were unable to evacuate the city.8  
The infirm elderly, poor, and disabled were the most likely to die in 
that notorious disaster.9  Members of vulnerable populations who 
survive could suffer permanent, debilitating injuries and become 
unable to work, live independently, and care for themselves.  
American taxpayers who pay for public safety-net programs would 
thus absorb the cost of increased use of such programs and loss of 
economic productivity.  As demonstrated in the aftermath of 
Hurricane Katrina, a failed emergency response could also cause the 
government to suffer humiliation and the public to lose faith in those 
responsible for its welfare.10  These prospects are alarming given the 
variety of potential emergencies that experts predict we will face in the 
SERVS., AT-RISK POPULATIONS AND PANDEMIC INFLUENZA:  PLANNING GUIDANCE FOR STATE, 
TERRITORIAL, TRIBAL, AND LOCAL HEALTH DEPARTMENTS 3-4 (2008), available at http:// 
www.astho.org/pubs/ASTHO_ARPP_Guidance_June3008.pdf [hereinafter ASTHO]; 
HEALTH SYS. RESEARCH, INC., ALTERED STANDARDS OF CARE IN MASS CASUALTY EVENTS 30-31 
(2005), available at http://www.ahrq.gov/research/altstand/altstand.pdf; Kathleen 
Tierney, Social Inequality, Hazards, and Disasters, in ON RISK AND DISASTER:  LESSONS FROM 
HURRICANE KATRINA 109, 112-20 (Ronald J. Daniels et al. eds., 2006); Public Health – 
Seattle & King County, Vulnerable Populations Action Team (VPAT), 
http://www.kingcounty.gov/healthservices/health/preparedness/VPAT.aspx (last visited 
Feb. 20, 2009). 
 6 Lori Uscher-Pines et al., Planning for an Influenza Pandemic:  Social Justice and 
Disadvantaged Groups, 37 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 32, 38 (2007). 
 7 Id. 
 8 David Hall, Katrina:  Spiritual Medicine for Political Complacency and for Social 
Activists Who Are Sleepwalking, 23 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 1, 2 n.4 (2007). 
 9 Katherine Pratt, Deficits and the Dividend Tax Cut:  Tax Policy as the Handmaiden 
of Budget Policy, 41 GA. L. REV. 503, 558-59 (2007) (asserting that over 75 percent of 
those who died in Katrina were over 60 years old). 
 10 L. Darnell Weeden, Hurricane Katrina and the Toxic Torts Implications of 
Environmental Injustice in New Orleans, 40 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1, 35 (2006) (“As a 
result of governmental conduct since Katrina, almost all Louisianans now seem to 
share a distrust of the government.”). 
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coming decades, ranging from bioterrorism attacks to natural disasters 
to pandemic influenza outbreaks.11 
The vulnerable groups that are the subject of this Article consist of 
tens of millions of people.12  According to the United States Census 
Bureau, in 2006, 41.3 million noninstitutionalized Americans over the 
age of five had disabilities.13  Many more may have physical or mental 
impairments that may impact their welfare during an emergency but 
are not deemed to be serious enough to constitute reportable 
disabilities.  In 2006, approximately 35.5 million individuals were 
sixty-five years of age or older14 and 38.8 million Americans were 
living in poverty.15  Children constitute approximately twenty-five 
percent of the United States population.16  Meanwhile, at the end of 
2007, approximately 2.3 million individuals were incarcerated in 
United States prisons and jails.17  Some subset of each of these groups 
will almost certainly have special needs during disasters. 
Unless the needs of vulnerable populations are addressed during all 
three phases of emergency response operations — pre-event planning 
and preparation, the event, and recovery18 — members of these 
 11 See Taiwo A. Oriola, Against the Plague:  Exemption of Pharmaceutical Patent 
Rights as a Biosecurity Strategy, 2007 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 287, 289 (“Experts have 
frequently warned of the high likelihood of a bioterrorism attack.”); Payal K. Shah, 
Assisting and Empowering Women Facing Natural Disasters:  Drawing from Security 
Council Resolution 1325, 15 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 711, 721 (2006) (“Over the past 
decades, experts have documented the increasing impact of natural disasters on the 
world’s population, with economic losses from natural disasters increasing more than 
ten times each decade.”); Jeffrey K. Taubenberger et al., The Next Influenza Pandemic:  
Can It Be Predicted?, 297 JAMA 2025, 2025 (2007) (“[M]ost experts believe another 
influenza pandemic will occur . . . .”). 
 12 See discussion infra Part I. 
 13 MATTHEW BRAULT, DISABILITY STATUS AND THE CHARACTERISTICS OF PEOPLE IN 
GROUP QUARTERS:  A BRIEF ANALYSIS OF THE CIVILIAN NONINSTITUTIONALIZED AND TOTAL 
POPULATIONS IN THE AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY 2 (2008), available at 
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/disability/GQdisability.pdf.  
 14 U.S. Census Bureau, Population by Age, Sex, Race and Hispanic Origin 
(Internet release date:  July 27, 2007), http://www.census.gov/population/socdemo/ 
age/2006older_table1.1.xls.  According to a different report, in 2005 one-and-a-half 
million Americans resided in nursing homes.  NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, THE CIVIL 
RIGHTS OF INSTITUTIONALIZED PERSONS ACT:  HAS IT FULFILLED ITS PROMISE? 7 (2005), 
available at http://www.ncd.gov/newsroom/publications/2005/pdf/personsect.pdf.  
 15 BRUCE H. WEBSTER, JR. & ALEMAYEHU BISHAW, INCOME, EARNING, AND POVERTY 
DATA FROM THE 2006 AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY 20 (2007), available at 
http://www.census.gov/prod/2007pubs/acs-08.pdf.  
 16 INST. OF MED., EMERGENCY CARE FOR CHILDREN:  GROWING PAINS 234 (2007). 
 17 HEATHER C. WEST & WILLIAM J. SABOL, PH.D., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRISONERS IN 
2007, at 6 (2008), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/p07.pdf.  
 18 U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., NATIONAL RESPONSE FRAMEWORK 27 (2008), 
1496 University of California, Davis [Vol. 42:1491 
communities are likely to suffer disproportionate harm in disasters.  
Their poor outcomes may be linked to lack of physical and emotional 
strength or a dearth of the social and economic resources upon which 
others rely during disasters.  Response and recovery efforts will be 
optimized only if decision makers have carefully prepared for 
emergencies at a time when they have the leisure to contemplate 
options and establish responsible policies.  However, planning and 
production of planning documents alone are not sufficient to achieve 
comprehensive and effective disaster readiness.  Rather, at a minimum, 
planners must identify at-risk individuals through registries, delegate 
authority and responsibility to appropriate governmental officials, 
collect supplies, and allocate resources, among other steps.19  
Consequently, the terms “planning” and “preparation” in this Article 
are meant to include not only the contemplation of response 
approaches, but also the implementation of readiness initiatives. 
Without appropriate preparation, vulnerable individuals may not be 
able to evacuate as instructed, reach points of distribution for medical 
countermeasures, understand written or verbal communications 
during an emergency, or find suitable housing if their residences are 
destroyed during a disaster.  For example, while all residents of 
affected areas were failed by the response to Hurricane Katrina, the 
vulnerable often suffered to a much greater extent than others.  The 
hearing impaired found that eighty percent of shelters did not have 
text telephones (“TTYs”); sixty percent of shelters had no television 
with open caption capability; only fifty-six percent of shelters posted 
announcements that were otherwise made verbally; and American Sign 
Language interpreters were available in fewer than thirty percent of 
shelters.20  Meanwhile, low-income African Americans often could not 
evacuate because they had no personal transportation.21  Furthermore, 
those with mobility impairments found that only five percent of the 
temporary housing provided by the Federal Emergency Management 
available at http://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nrf/nrf-core.pdf (identifying “three 
phases of effective response” as “prepare, respond, and recover”). 
 19 See infra Part IV.B for recommendations. 
 20 NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, THE IMPACT OF HURRICANES KATRINA AND RITA ON 
PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES:  A LOOK BACK AND REMAINING CHALLENGES 14 (2006), 
available at http://www.ncd.gov/newsroom/publications/2006/pdf/hurricanes_impact. 
pdf; PAUL CAMPBELL ET AL., HARVARD SCH. OF PUB. HEALTH, REACHING VULNERABLE 
POPULATIONS IN PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCIES:  CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS 9 (2007), 
available at http://www.mcph.org/Major_Activities/Emergency_Preparedness/2007/ 
2007_Final_Conference_Report_pdf. 
 21 Andrulis et al., supra note 1, at 1269. 
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Agency (“FEMA”) was accessible to them even though twenty-five 
percent of the displaced population needed accessible housing.22 
The fate of the disadvantaged during disasters has received little if 
any attention in the legal literature.  This Article introduces legal 
analysis into the discussion of preparedness for vulnerable 
populations.23  Numerous civil rights laws establish that vulnerable 
populations have a right to be free of discrimination and to enjoy 
certain benefits and governmental protections.24  These rights and 
obligations are binding not only during ordinary times, but also 
during emergencies.  Nevertheless, the existing legal framework must 
be supplemented by specific provisions in emergency response laws 
that mandate disaster planning to address the needs of vulnerable 
populations. 
Preparation for the needs of vulnerable groups is most likely to 
occur if it is statutorily mandated.  These groups often have weak 
political voices25 and may not become a focus for governmental 
planners without laws requiring agencies to expressly account for the 
vulnerable.  This Article develops recommendations for federal and 
state law provisions that require specific planning activities designed 
to safeguard the welfare of the disadvantaged.26  It also explores ethical 
theories of distributive justice that address how the government 
should allocate scarce resources.27  While the government may not be 
able to anticipate and address every need of all vulnerable groups, 
experts agree that certain initiatives can improve outcomes for the 
vulnerable.28  For example, much can be accomplished by working 
with advocacy and community groups and by requiring private 
vendors who supply services during disasters to accommodate the 
needs of vulnerable groups.  In addition, officials must communicate 
effectively with all segments of society to educate the public about 
what individuals must do for themselves during emergencies.29  State 
 22 CAMPBELL ET AL., supra note 20, at 9.   
 23 See infra Part III. 
 24 See infra Part III.A. 
 25 Sylvia A. Law & Barry Ensminger, Negotiating Physicians’ Fees:  Individual 
Patients or Society? (A Case Study in Federalism), 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 81 (1986) (“The 
political voices of . . . those who are medically and economically vulnerable . . . are . . . 
diffuse and weak.”). 
 26 See infra Part IV.B. 
 27 See infra Part II. 
 28 See infra Part IV.B.2 (describing experts’ recommendations). 
 29 See infra Part IV.B.2.  See generally ASTHO, supra note 5 (discussing ways to 
identify, communicate with, collaborate with, educate, and provide services to at-risk 
populations).   
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and federal emergency response statutes should provide planning 
authorities with detailed instructions to ensure that such initiatives are 
undertaken. 
The Article proceeds as follows.  Part I addresses the question of 
who “vulnerable populations” are in the context of disasters.  It 
identifies and assesses the needs of numerous at-risk groups.  Part II 
turns to ethical questions concerning how resources should be 
allocated in the process of planning for and responding to disasters.  
This Part explores whether there are moral justifications for investing 
disproportionate resources in accommodating the needs of the 
disadvantaged.  In so doing, it presents several theories of distributive 
justice30 and analyzes how they illuminate the question of resource 
allocation for vulnerable populations.  Part III examines a variety of 
federal and state laws that establish nondiscrimination mandates and 
other obligations that public and private entities have towards 
vulnerable populations.  These include federal and state disability 
laws, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the 
Eighth Amendment, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 
similar state laws, and the tort of negligence.  These laws reflect a 
long-standing commitment to protecting the rights of the vulnerable.  
This Part then presents a comprehensive survey of existing federal and 
state emergency response laws that include provisions addressing 
special needs communities.  Part IV, the recommendations section, 
first argues that the existing statutory scheme constitutes a patchwork 
characterized by many gaps and shortcomings.  To address these 
shortcomings, I then develop a proposal for statutory revisions that 
will more effectively safeguard the interests of the disadvantaged 
during disasters.  Only with appropriate planning and resources will 
the vulnerable be able to survive and thrive after disasters.  Such 
preparation is of critical importance based on ethical, legal, and 
practical considerations. 
I. VULNERABLE POPULATIONS 
Vulnerable populations, also called “special needs” populations31 or 
“at-risk” populations,32 are those that are particularly “at risk of poor 
 30 Distributive justice is concerned with the proper allocation of resources, 
benefits, and rewards.  See NORMAN J. FINKEL, NOT FAIR!:  THE TYPOLOGY OF 
COMMONSENSE UNFAIRNESS 23 (2001). 
 31 FEMA, NRF Resource Center Glossary/Acronyms, http://www.fema.gov/ 
emergency/nrf/glossary.htm#Top (last visited Feb. 21, 2009) (using term “special 
needs populations”). 
 32 Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act of 2006, 42 U.S.C. § 300hh-
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physical, psychological, or social health” after a disaster.33  They have 
“additional needs before, during, and after an incident in functional 
areas, including but not limited to:  maintaining independence, 
communication, transportation, supervision, and medical care.”34  The 
term “vulnerable” in this Article is thus used to indicate the 
dependencies of particular populations.35  Different groups are 
traditionally recognized as vulnerable in different contexts.36  During 
disasters, several population segments are potentially vulnerable.  
These include (1) individuals with physical and mental disabilities, (2) 
elderly persons, (3) pregnant women, (4) children, (5) prisoners, (6) 
economically disadvantaged minorities, (7) undocumented workers, 
and (8) those with language barriers.37  This Part analyzes the 
vulnerabilities of each group. 
A. Individuals with Disabilities 
Large-scale disasters may leave individuals with physical and mental 
disabilities particularly challenged and helpless.  Governmental 
assistance may be inadequate and may end too quickly after a disaster 
to meet the needs of the disabled.38  Individuals with physical 
disabilities may be underserved in a variety of ways during a disaster.  
For example, those with hearing impairments may not be able to 
understand evacuation orders or instructions provided in shelters.39  
1(b)(4) (2006) (using term “at-risk individuals”). 
 33 LU ANN ADAY, AT RISK IN AMERICA:  THE HEALTH AND HEALTH CARE NEEDS OF 
VULNERABLE POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 4 (2d ed. 2001).  Another source 
defines “vulnerability” as “the characteristics of a person or group and their situation 
that influence their capacity to anticipate, cope with, resist and recover” from a 
disaster.   BEN WISNER ET AL., AT RISK:  NATURAL HAZARDS, PEOPLE’S VULNERABILITY AND 
DISASTERS 11 (2d ed. 2005). 
 34 FEMA, supra note 31. 
 35 See Ani B. Satz, Disability, Vulnerability, and the Limits of Antidiscrimination, 83 
WASH. L. REV. 513, 523-25 (2008) (discussing concept of universal vulnerability and 
how it differs from common understanding of vulnerability). 
 36 See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.111(b), .201-.409 (2008) (establishing additional 
protections for research involving fetuses, pregnant women, in vitro fertilization, 
prisoners, and children). 
 37 See 42 U.S.C. § 300hh-1(b)(4)(B) (2006); HEALTH SYS. RESEARCH, INC., supra 
note 5, at 30-31; Tierney, supra note 5, at 112-20; FEMA, supra note 31; Public Health 
— Seattle & King County, supra note 5. 
 38 NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, THE NEEDS OF PEOPLE WITH PSYCHIATRIC 
DISABILITIES DURING AND AFTER HURRICANES KATRINA AND RITA:  POSITION PAPER AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 6 (2006), available at http://www.ncd.gov/newsroom/publications/ 
2006/pdf/peopleneeds.pdf.  
 39 NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 20, at 4. 
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To the extent that official communication is transmitted through 
visual displays on television broadcasts, television monitors, or on 
paper, people with visual impairments might be unable to obtain 
critical information.40  Accessible transportation may be unavailable to 
evacuate the wheelchair-bound, and shelters may not have accessible 
entrances, restrooms, and dining areas or adequate medical care.41  It 
is also possible that during triaging processes, some health care 
providers may determine that individuals with disabilities are of a 
lower priority than others because treating them is more difficult or 
complicated.  These are not theoretical difficulties.  A report by the 
National Council on Disability concerning Hurricanes Katrina and 
Rita highlights these concerns.  It provides accounts of individuals 
turned away from shelters, forced to sleep in their wheelchairs, and 
housed in inappropriate conditions, where they developed debilitating 
bedsores and other medical problems.42  After emergencies, 
individuals with disabilities may also find it more difficult to secure 
accessible apartments or trailers, health care, appropriate schooling, 
and employment in areas that have been devastated by a disaster.43 
Those with mental disabilities may also face acute difficulties in 
emergencies.  Their evacuation may be mismanaged by emergency 
responders who misunderstand their behavior or are uncomfortable 
with them, and shelters may refuse to accept them or be ill equipped 
to meet their needs.44  Individuals with mental disabilities may receive 
rough treatment if they are unable to follow instructions45 and be 
inappropriately institutionalized as a convenient solution.46  After 
Hurricane Katrina, FEMA reportedly refused to provide trailers to 
some individuals with known mental health histories even though 
they were capable of living independently.47  Some mentally ill 
survivors were not able to fill out complicated housing applications 
and were not provided adequate assistance.48  In addition, untrained 
FEMA officials assessed others as too disabled to live on their own.49  
Without appropriate planning that anticipates and accommodates the 
 40 Id. at 5. 
 41 Id. at 11. 
 42 Id. at 13-14. 
 43 Id. at 15-21. 
 44 See id. at 3-4.  
 45 See id. at 12. 
 46 NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 38, at 18-20. 
 47 Id. at 7. 
 48 Id. 
 49 Id. 
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needs of the physically and mentally disabled, these populations are 
likely to be underserved in disasters and consequently suffer poor 
outcomes. 
B. Elderly Persons  
Individuals who are sixty-five or older are more likely than others to 
suffer from chronic diseases, including arthritis, hypertension, heart 
disease, diabetes, and respiratory ailments.50  Eighty percent of adults 
in this age group have at least one chronic illness, and fifty percent 
have two or more chronic conditions.51  Older adults may also suffer 
from mobility, cognitive, sensory, social, and economic limitations 
that can impede their adaptability and ability to function in disasters.52  
As a result, they may become agitated, overwhelmed, and 
traumatized.53  Additionally, during emergencies and in their 
aftermaths, the health of older adults can deteriorate because of poor 
nutrition, extreme temperatures, exposure to infection, interruptions 
in medical treatment, and emotional distress.54  Among individuals 
with disabilities, those who are elderly may require particular 
attention and support because of their frailties. 
C. Pregnant Women 
Pregnant women will also have special needs and face increased 
risks during disasters.  These include premature deliveries, 
underweight infants, and infant mortality.55  Some women may have to 
deliver babies without the benefit of hospital care.56  Pregnant women 
also run the risk of being evacuated without access to medical records 
containing information critical to their welfare or that of their 
 50 Nancy Aldrich & William F. Benson, Disaster Preparedness and the Chronic 
Disease Needs of Vulnerable Older Adults, 5 PREVENTING CHRONIC DISEASE 1, 1 (2008), 
available at http://www.cdc.gov/pcd/issues/2008/jan/07_0135.htm.  
 51 Id. at 2 (“Nearly 50% of adults aged 65 or older have hypertension, 36% have 
arthritis, 20% have coronary heart disease, 20% have cancer, 15% have diabetes, and 
9% have had a stroke.”).  
 52 Id. 
 53 Id. 
 54 Id. (discussing survey of 680 Hurricane Katrina evacuees living in Houston 
shelters).   
 55 Rama Lakshmi, Group Urges Disaster Planning for Pregnant Women, Babies, 
WASH. POST, Aug. 17, 2006, at A09. 
 56 KAREN OLNESS ET AL., HOW TO HELP THE CHILDREN IN HUMANITARIAN DISASTERS 
123-28 (2d ed. 2006) (describing planning and preparation for women’s obstetrical 
needs in disasters). 
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fetuses.57  They may lose access to prenatal vitamins or other essential 
medication.58  Pandemic outbreaks may be particularly life threatening 
for pregnant women or their unborn children, and exposure to other 
illnesses, such as viruses, in crowded shelters could constitute a 
further hazard.  Furthermore, if relief workers are unaware of women’s 
pregnancies, they might include them in mass vaccination or other 
prophylactic programs contraindicated for pregnant individuals.59 
D. Children 
Children are a vulnerable population because of their susceptibility 
to injury and their dependence on others for livelihood, decision 
making, and emotional support.60  Studies have shown that children 
who are injured by explosions are at greater risk of significant trauma 
than are adults.61  Children may also suffer greater harm from 
exposure to bioterrorism agents because of their size, metabolisms, 
respiratory rates, and other factors.62  Moreover, the physiological 
differences between children and adults are numerous, relating to 
head and tongue size in proportion to other body parts, nerve 
conduction, ventilation, oxygen demand, circulating blood flow, 
vulnerability of the liver and spleen, and skin thickness.63  Children 
are likely to develop dehydration, malnutrition, and exhaustion more 
quickly than adults, and they are more susceptible to infectious 
 57 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Critical Needs in Caring for 
Pregnant Women During Times of Disaster for Non-Obstetric Health Care Providers, 
http://www.bt.cdc.gov/disasters/pregnantdisasterhcp.asp (last visited Feb. 21, 2009).  
 58 Id. 
 59 William M. Callaghan et al., Health Concerns of Women and Infants in Times of 
Natural Disasters:  Lessons Learned from Hurricane Katrina, 11 MATERNAL CHILD 
HEALTH J. 307, 307, 310 (2007) (discussing adverse impact on pregnancy of exposure 
to toxins, stress, and limited access to health care and risks of certain vaccinations); 
Bonnie Ewing et al., Assisting Pregnant Women to Prepare for Disaster, 33 AM. J. 
MATERNAL CHILD NURSING 98, 99 (2008) (“Pregnant women are a vulnerable 
population at high risk for injury, illness, and death before, during, and after 
disasters.”); Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, supra note 57. 
 60 See INST. OF MED., supra note 16, at 223 (“Children react differently than adults 
to medical emergencies because of anatomical, physiological, developmental, and 
emotional differences.  Because of these differences, children are among the most 
vulnerable individuals in the event of a disaster.”). 
 61 Diana G. Fendya, When Disaster Strikes — Care Considerations for Pediatric 
Patients, 13 J. TRAUMA NURSING 161, 161 (2006). 
 62 Shelly D. Martin et al., A National Survey of Terrorism Preparedness Training 
Among Pediatric, Family Practice, and Emergency Medicine Programs, 118 PEDIATRICS 
e620, e625 (2006), available at http://www.pediatrics.org/cgi/content/full/118/3/e620.  
 63 Fendya, supra note 61, at 163-64. 
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diseases and severe forms of illnesses than are older individuals.64  All 
of these factors affect children’s treatment needs and medical 
outcomes.  In addition, caring for children in an emergency involves 
psychological and social challenges stemming from their level of 
cognitive ability, emotional vulnerability, and dependence upon the 
support of family members.65 
Thus, treatment that would be adequate for adults might be 
negligent or even grossly negligent66 if administered to children.  For 
example, children need different medication dosages and medical 
equipment sizes than adults, and the water pressure used to 
decontaminate67 older people who are exposed to chemical releases is 
inappropriate for young children.68  According to one study, fewer 
than fifty percent of emergency medicine programs that responded to 
a terrorism preparedness survey reported having adequate training 
relating to child victims.69  In addition, there are comparatively few 
pediatric hospital beds, pediatric specialists, or providers with 
expertise in caring for children.70   
Children require special attention and procedures during disasters, 
and they are often identified as a population that should be prioritized 
during relief efforts.  For example, a government guidance document 
concerning the allocation of pandemic influenza vaccines reported 
that an essential priority of vaccine programs should be to protect 
children.71  Yet, despite these initiatives, many agree that those 
 64 OLNESS ET AL., supra note 56, at 35. 
 65 Fendya, supra note 61, at 164-65. 
 66 Gross negligence is “an intentional failure to perform a manifest duty in 
reckless disregard of the consequences as affecting the life or property of another.”  
Marriott Corp. v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 723 A.2d 454, 462 (Md. 1988); 
Karen J. Kruger, Governmental Immunity in Maryland:  A Practitioner’s Guide to Making 
and Defending Tort Claims, 36 U. BALT. L. REV. 37, 53 (2007) (discussing high standard 
for proving gross negligence). 
 67 To decontaminate is to free of harmful substances, such as hazardous 
chemicals.  WEBSTER’S II NEW COLLEGE DICTIONARY 293 (3d ed. 2004). 
 68 Fendya, supra note 61, at 162. 
 69 Martin et al., supra note 62, at e620. 
 70 INST. OF MED., supra note 16, at 235 (“In the event of a disaster, the capacity of 
the health care system to care for a large number of children is likely to be 
inadequate.”). 
 71 U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS. & U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 
GUIDANCE ON ALLOCATING AND TARGETING PANDEMIC INFLUENZA VACCINE 2-3, 13 
(2008), available at http://www.pandemicflu.gov/vaccine/allocationguidance.pdf.  
Others who were identified as deserving priority were key pandemic responders and 
health care providers, those maintaining “essential community services,” and 
individuals at greatest risk of infection because of their work.  Id. at 3. 
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involved in the process of public health emergency planning have too 
often overlooked the needs of pediatric patients.72 
E. Prisoners 
Because they are in custody, prisoners are entirely dependent upon 
governmental authorities for their welfare during a disaster, and, 
therefore, they too are a vulnerable population.  Prisoners cannot 
evacuate on their own, seek medical care, or obtain food, shelter, and 
supplies unless authorities provide these to them.73  Furthermore, in 
the chaos of an emergency, inmates could be subject to attacks by 
fellow prisoners or poorly trained, panicked guards.74 
Events in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina illustrate just how 
vulnerable prisoners are during disasters.  The American Civil 
Liberties Union (“ACLU”) issued a 2006 report entitled Abandoned and 
Abused, which describes the shocking conditions prisoners in the 
Orleans Parish Prison (“OPP”) faced during and after Hurricane 
Katrina.75  The following excerpt from the ACLU report vividly 
illustrates the dangers prisoners can face during a disaster: 
As floodwaters rose in the OPP Buildings, power was lost, and 
entire buildings were plunged into darkness.  Deputies left 
their posts wholesale, leaving behind prisoners in locked cells, 
some standing in sewage-tainted water up to their chests.  
Over the next few days, without food, water, or ventilation, 
prisoners broke windows in order to get air, and carved holes 
in the jail’s walls in an effort to get to safety. . . . Once freed 
from the buildings, prisoners were bused to receiving facilities 
around the state, . . . [though at one correctional center] 
thousands of OPP evacuees spent several days on a large 
outdoor field, where prisoner-on-prisoner violence was 
rampant and went unchecked by correctional officers.76 
This episode demonstrates the manifest need for a systematic 
approach to disaster relief for prisoners.  While many if not most state 
departments of corrections have emergency preparation systems or 
 72 INST. OF MED., supra note 16, at 226, 229; Fendya, supra note 61, at 161. 
 73 See Ira P. Robbins, Lessons from Hurricane Katrina:  Prison Emergency 
Preparedness as a Constitutional Imperative, 42 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1, 3-4 (2008). 
 74 Id. 
 75 See generally AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, ABANDONED AND ABUSED (2006), 
available at http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/prison/oppreport20060809.pdf.  
 76 Id. at 9. 
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plans,77 commentators have criticized these as inadequate.78  In 
particular, the plans have been found to be lacking in the areas of 
emergency training, drills and exercises, and preparation for possible 
terrorist attacks.79  
F. Economically Disadvantaged Minorities, Undocumented Workers, 
and Individuals with Language Barriers 
Economically and socially disadvantaged individuals are likely to 
suffer disproportionate harm from disasters because they lack 
resources and adequate support systems.80  Two disasters within the 
past two decades illustrate the problems facing those with 
socioeconomic disadvantages.  In 1995, over 700 people died during a 
weeklong heat wave in Chicago.81  African Americans were one-and-a-
half times more likely to die than whites because they were 
impoverished, segregated, and lacked “social capital.”82  Ten years 
later, during Hurricane Katrina, the majority of those who remained in 
New Orleans were African Americans, and 21,787 black households 
reportedly had no car with which to evacuate the city.83  
Communication barriers compounded their problems, as residents 
who followed television broadcasts received untimely and 
contradictory evacuation instructions from authorities.84  In addition, 
African-American refugees were not always welcomed by other 
communities.85  At one point, a large group of mostly black refugees 
 77 JEFFREY A. SCHWARTZ & CYNTHIA BARRY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, A GUIDE TO 
PREPARING FOR AND RESPONDING TO PRISON EMERGENCIES 185-98 (2005), available at 
http://www.nicic.org/pubs/2005/020293.pdf (reporting on survey to which 33 state 
departments of correction responded and estimating that 70 to 85 percent of 
departments have emergency preparedness systems in place).   
 78 Robbins, supra note 73, at 14.   
 79 Id. at 13-20. 
 80 Daniel Farber, Disaster Law and Inequality, 25 LAW & INEQ. 297, 302 (2007); 
Sherrie Armstrong Tomlinson, Note, No New Orleanians Left Behind:  An Examination 
of the Disparate Impact of Hurricane Katrina on Minorities, 38 CONN. L. REV. 1153, 1161 
(2006). 
 81 Farber, supra note 80, at 304-05. 
 82 Id. 
 83 Id. at 297-98, 302. 
 84 Andrulis et al., supra note 1, at 1269; Keith Elder et al., African Americans’ 
Decisions Not To Evacuate New Orleans Before Hurricane Katrina:  A Qualitative Study, 
97 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH S124, S126 (2007). 
 85 Tomlinson, supra note 80, at 1168-72 (discussing role of racism in Katrina 
response, including “false reports of violence and the subsequent strong-armed 
reaction”).  
1506 University of California, Davis [Vol. 42:1491 
attempted to walk across a bridge to Gretna, Louisiana, but were 
stopped by armed police because the City of Gretna did not wish to 
allow their entry or help them.86  In addition, economically 
disadvantaged individuals are less likely than wealthier people to own 
residences and to benefit from insurance proceeds and other assistance 
available to homeowners after a disaster.87  Lack of medical insurance 
may also impede the recovery of those who have suffered health 
consequences because of an emergency.88 
Another group of vulnerable individuals, migrant workers, might be 
lured to areas that have been devastated by a catastrophe, hoping to 
find long-term, lucrative work assignments during the rebuilding 
process.89  In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, thousands of 
workers, many of whom were undocumented, moved to New 
Orleans.90  However, employers often housed individuals in deplorable 
conditions, required them to do extremely hazardous work, and 
denied them the pay they were promised.91  In addition, post-Katrina 
workers, like 9/11 responders, faced significant health risks and were 
not provided appropriate training or protective gear.92 
Undocumented individuals who are themselves victims of a disaster 
are eligible for short-term assistance after an emergency but, because 
of their illegal status, they are not qualified for long-term shelter or 
 86 Farber, supra note 80, at 303; Tomlinson, supra note 80, at 1171.  Sixty-two 
percent of those who died in New Orleans were African American.  SELECT BIPARTISAN 
COMM. TO INVESTIGATE THE PREPARATION FOR & RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA, 
109TH CONG., A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE:  FINAL REPORT OF THE SELECT BIPARTISAN 
COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE PREPARATION FOR AND RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA 
115 (2006), available at http://katrina.house.gov.  However, African Americans appear 
not to have suffered a disproportionate number of deaths, as 68 percent of New 
Orleans’ population was black in 2005.  See Census Says New Orleans Is Still a 
“Chocolate” Metropolis, THE LA. WEEKLY, Aug. 29, 2008, available at 
http://www.louisianaweekly.com/news.php?viewStory=257.  
 87 Farber, supra note 80, at 305. 
 88 In 2007, 45.7 million Americans were uninsured.  See Press Release, U.S. 
Census Bureau, Household Income Rises, Poverty Rates Unchanged, Number of 
Uninsured Down (Aug. 26, 2008) (http://www.census.gov/Press-Release/www/ 
releases/archives/income_wealth/012528.html).  
 89 Haley E. Olam & Erin S. Stamper, Note, The Suspension of the Davis-Bacon Act 
and the Exploitation of Migrant Workers in the Wake of Hurricane Katrina, 24 HOFSTRA 
LAB. & EMP. L.J. 145, 145 (2006). 
 90 Id. 
 91 Id. at 163-65. 
 92 Id. at 167-68. 
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food programs.93  Many may hesitate to turn to authorities for any aid 
at all because they fear prosecution for immigration violations.94 
Finally, people with limited or nonexistent English language skills, 
who may or may not be otherwise disadvantaged, could face 
difficulties because they do not understand government-issued 
communications.  Even efforts to translate communications might fail 
if translators do not pay careful attention to the nuances of language 
and to words, phrases, and concepts that cannot faithfully be 
translated from English to other languages.95  Furthermore, efforts to 
distribute information to minorities through the Internet will be 
ineffective for those without computer access or sophisticated 
computer skills.96 
As this Part has made clear, there are many populations whose 
dependencies make them vulnerable to disproportionate harm during 
disasters.  But should society devote resources to protect these 
vulnerable groups during emergencies?  The next Part explores 
normative responses to this question. 
II. NORMATIVE ARGUMENTS 
Emergency preparedness for vulnerable populations raises 
challenging ethical questions.  In the midst of a disaster, how should 
limited resources be allocated?  To what extent should the needs of 
vulnerable populations be prioritized?  For example, if health care 
providers are overwhelmed by a demand for medical care, should 
patients be treated simply on a first-come, first-served basis?  Should 
patients be selected for treatment based on their anticipated 
prognosis?  Should patients’ social worth be considered in resource 
allocation decisions?  Even the most prominent ethicists acknowledge 
that these problems are unresolved and have no easy solutions.97 
The intractability of these questions has not prevented scholars and 
philosophers from proffering answers.  This Part briefly explores 
several approaches to distributive justice, including utilitarianism, 
 93 INT’L HUMAN RIGHTS LAW CLINIC, UNIV. OF CAL., BERKELEY SCH. OF LAW, WHEN 
DISASTER STRIKES:  A HUMAN RIGHTS ANALYSIS OF THE 2005 GULF COAST HURRICANES 25-
26 (2006), available at http://humanrights.vcop.edu/berkeley/disaster_strikes_ 
version2.pdf. 
 94 Id. at 26. 
 95 Andrulis et al., supra note 1, at 1272. 
 96 Id. (finding that “most resources and materials targeting minorities are 
disseminated primarily through the Internet”). 
 97 Norman Daniels, Four Unsolved Rationing Problems:  A Challenge, 24 HASTINGS 
CENTER REP. 27, 27 (1994). 
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equal chances, and the best outcome for the least well off.98  The 
purpose of this Part is not to develop a definitive answer to the 
complex ethical question of whether the disadvantaged should receive 
priority or disproportionate resources in the midst of a disaster and 
extreme scarcity.  Rather, this Part shows that the difficulty in 
determining how to allocate scarce resources during disasters 
necessitates advanced planning.  Planning before catastrophic events 
have struck will diminish the need for government agencies to make 
difficult moral choices in the midst of emergencies. 
A. Utilitarianism 
According to utilitarian principles, actions are appropriate if they 
produce the greatest amount of good for the greatest number of 
people.99  Actions need not have similar or identical consequences for 
all impacted individuals; rather, they must achieve the maximum 
overall benefit.100  In the context of triage, the principle of utility 
might translate into a policy of attempting to save the greatest number 
of lives and thus to direct treatment to those who are most likely to 
benefit from it.101  For example, health care providers may withhold 
medical resources from individuals considered unlikely to benefit 
 98 See supra note 30. 
 99 J.J. C. SMART & BERNARD WILLIAMS, UTILITARIANISM FOR AND AGAINST 30, 47 
(1973) (explaining that under utilitarianism action A is to be chosen over action B if 
doing A will make mankind happier than doing B and if probable benefit will be 
maximized); John C. Moskop & Kenneth V. Iserson, Triage in Medicine, Part II:  
Underlying Values and Principles, 49 ANNALS EMERGENCY MED. 282, 284 (2007). 
 100 See sources cited supra note 99. 
 101 See GERALD R. WINSLOW, TRIAGE AND JUSTICE 63-70 (1982).  The author outlines 
five “ranking principles for triage”: 
U-1. The principle of medical success.  Priority given to those for whom 
treatment has the highest probability of medical success. 
U-2. The principle of immediate usefulness.  Priority given to the most 
useful under the immediate circumstances. 
U-3. The principle of conservation.  Priority given to those who require 
proportionately smaller amounts of the resources. 
U-4. The principle of parental role.  Priority given to those who have the 
largest responsibilities to dependents. 
U-5. The principle of general social value.  Priority given to those believed 
to have the greatest general social worth. 
Id. at 105-06; Moskop & Iserson, supra note 99, at 283; Nicki Pesik et al., Terrorism and 
the Ethics of Emergency Medical Care, 37 ANNALS EMERGENCY MED. 642, 644 (2001). 
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significantly from care.  Such individuals include those with 
complicating factors or circumstances that prevent people from 
thriving, complying with medical protocols, or caring for themselves 
after treatment, such as multiple illnesses, drug or alcohol abuse, 
homelessness, or social or behavioral problems.102  Furthermore, 
providers might deny care to injured patients who require 
considerable resources because of underlying infirmities or disabilities 
in order to save multiple patients who are healthier and require less 
treatment.103  Utilitarian principles might militate against prioritizing 
care for the disadvantaged in an emergency if such individuals would 
require a disproportionate amount of resources.   
Not all philosophers embrace utilitarianism principles.  Some 
commentators criticize utilitarianism on at least three grounds.104  
First, utilitarianism may lead to results that defy moral and ethical 
values.  For example, at its extremes, utilitarianism might lead one to 
justify killing a single individual in order to transplant her organs in 
others, saving multiple lives.105  Second, it can be difficult to predict 
who will actually benefit most from treatment and who will live the 
most valuable lives posttreatment.106  Third, even assuming the ability 
to predict these subsequent developments, utilitarianism requires 
unpalatable assumptions about the value of one life over another.  For 
example, is the life of a quadriplegic patient less worth saving than the 
life of a nondisabled person?  How can we assume that the 
quadriplegic individual does not derive as much pleasure from living, 
has a shorter life expectancy, or cannot contribute as much to society 
as others?  What if the quadriplegic individual is Stephen Hawking?  
By contrast, what if the able-bodied person who is saved instead of the 
quadriplegic is a reckless driver prone to causing life-threatening 
accidents?  Thus, utilitarianism can raise as many questions about 
distributive justice as it answers. 
 102 Asha V. Devereaux et al., Definitive Care for the Critically Ill During a Disaster:  
A Framework for Allocation of Scarce Resources in Mass Critical Care:  Tbl. 6, 133 CHEST 
J. 51S, 60S (2008) (describing exclusion criteria for triage purposes); Moskop & 
Iserson, supra note 99, at 283; Pesik et al., supra note 101, at 644-45. 
 103 Moskop & Iserson, supra note 99, at 285. 
 104 See SMART & WILLIAMS, supra note 99, at 67-73, 77-150 (critiquing 
utilitarianism). 
 105 Moskop & Iserson, supra note 99, at 285. 
 106 Id. at 284 (“A standard criticism of utilitarianism is that it is often very difficult 
to predict the consequences of one’s actions accurately.”). 
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B. Equal Chances 
A second approach to distributive justice is the principle of equal 
chances.  This principle requires health care providers to give each 
individual an equal chance to survive on the theory that each person’s 
life is equally valuable to him or her.107  This approach rejects the 
utilitarian argument that decision makers should calculate the sum of 
all anticipated benefits and burdens at issue in making treatment 
determinations.108 
The philosopher John Taurek presented the following example to 
illustrate the theory of equal chances: 
I have a supply of some life-saving drug.  Six people will all 
certainly die if they are not treated with the drug.  But one of 
the six requires all of the drug if he is to survive.  Each of the 
other five requires only one-fifth of the drug.  What ought I to 
do?109 
Taurek concludes that he should give each person an equal chance 
to survive and flip a coin to decide whether to give the drug to the one 
person who needs all of it or to the five who need only a fraction of 
the available amount.110  The individual requiring all of the 
medication, like the other five, would have a fifty-fifty likelihood of 
being saved.111  For purposes of establishing a disaster triaging policy, 
Taurek’s philosophy would require a first-come, first-served process 
by which all treatable patients who arrive while resources are available 
would be given identical priority regardless of whether they need very 
intensive care or much more limited treatment.112  In the alternative, a 
lottery system could be established.113 
Critics of Taurek’s philosophy argue that allowing many to perish in 
order to save the few is irrational.  For example, in an essay entitled 
Why the Numbers Should Sometimes Count, John Saunders presents a 
hypothetical in which there is a choice between saving a single life and 
saving ten billion lives.114  Saunders asks whether even in these 
 107 Id. at 286. 
 108 Id. 
 109 John M. Taurek, Should the Numbers Count?, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 293, 294 (1977). 
 110 Id. at 303. 
 111 Id. 
 112 WINSLOW, supra note 101, at 98-101 (discussing principle of prioritizing those 
who arrive first); Moskop & Iserson, supra note 99, at 286.     
 113 WINSLOW, supra note 101, at 101-05 (discussing random selection for triaging 
purposes). 
 114 John T. Saunders, Why the Numbers Should Sometimes Count, 17 PHIL. & PUB. 
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circumstances, Taurek would give the same priority to the single 
individual as to the ten billion.  He argues that if human beings are 
valuable as human beings, it is only right to attempt to save as many of 
them as possible and to “count the numbers.”115 
Still, the equal chances principle raises thought-provoking questions 
as to whether, in the face of scarce resources, the default rule should 
be to try to save the many and sacrifice the few who need the most 
care.  Do decision makers have a right to establish priorities based on 
value judgments concerning the worth of human lives?  Those who 
are denied care likely have a fierce will to live and see their lives as 
immeasurably valuable.  Thus, they will suffer intensely from the 
knowledge that they have been doomed to die while others are saved. 
The equal chances theory does not support prioritizing the 
vulnerable over other disaster victims.  Rather, it establishes an ethical 
nondiscrimination mandate that forbids deeming the disadvantaged to 
be less eligible for rescue based on the medical, social, or economic 
resources that they may require during and after disasters. 
C. The Best Outcome for the Least Well Off 
A third normative argument, the theory of “the best outcome for the 
least well off,” supports prioritizing the needs of vulnerable 
populations over others.  Disadvantaged members of society will likely 
suffer disproportionate harm in disasters because of poverty, 
disabilities, isolation, and lack of resources with which to survive and 
recover.116  According to this theory, authorities should distribute 
limited resources unequally in order to maximize benefits for the least 
well off.117  Consequently, the least advantaged members of society 
would receive maximum benefits so that death — the  worst outcome 
and the one most likely to be suffered by the disadvantaged — is 
avoided if at all possible.118 
John Rawls articulates the rationale behind this approach in A 
Theory of Justice.119  Rawls outlines the principles of justice that 
AFF. 3, 3-4 (1988). 
 115 Id. at 13. 
 116 Farber, supra note 80, at 321 (“[T]he social disadvantages our society treats as 
ordinary and unremarkable become deadly in dramatic ways during the course of a 
disaster.”). 
 117  WINSLOW, supra note 101, at 92-98 (discussing approaches of prioritizing 
medically neediest and those who are generally neediest and most helpless); Moskop 
& Iserson, supra note 99, at 285. 
 118 Moskop & Iserson, supra note 99, at 285. 
 119 See generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1999). 
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hypothetical decision makers would choose were they operating 
behind a “veil of ignorance.”120  These decision makers would not 
know their own specific circumstances in life, such as their social 
status, personal strengths, and weaknesses.  Consequently, the 
decision makers would not be prejudiced by their own agendas and 
expectations in life.121  Rawls argues that the veil of ignorance would 
promote procedural justice and would prevent decision makers from 
exploiting people’s diverse social and personal circumstances for their 
own advantage.122  Rawls further hypothesizes that these decision 
makers would wish to maximize benefits for the worst off in the hope 
of ensuring their own good outcomes if they themselves were to fare 
poorly one day.123  Thus, Rawls posits a “difference principle,”124 
according to which unequal distribution of wealth and income is 
permissible only if it is to the advantage of those who are least 
fortunate.125 
Emergencies involving illness and injuries, however, may 
complicate this approach.  The worst off will presumably be the 
sickest, and their risk of death will be highest.  Thus, it is arguably 
irrational to plan to expend sizeable medical resources on what may 
well be futile attempts to save them.126  Nevertheless, the argument 
that the government should redistribute resources to maximize 
benefits for the least advantaged is useful in that it emphasizes that 
some members of society may have greater resources and support 
networks with which to help themselves during emergencies than 
others.  Thus, in the face of scarcity, officials may be justified in 
prioritizing the needs of those who are socially, economically, or 
medically vulnerable because these individuals could suffer 
particularly acute and long-lasting harm.  As one commentator asserts, 
“Social justice. . . requires action to preserve human dignity for all, 
particularly those who suffer from systematic disadvantage.”127 
 120 Id. at 118-23. 
 121 Id. at 118. 
 122 Id.  
 123 Id. at 132-33; WINSLOW, supra note 101, at 51-52. 
 124 RAWLS, supra note 119, at 65-70.  
 125 Id. at 68-70, 175. 
 126 Moskop & Iserson, supra note 99, at 285. 
 127 Lawrence O. Gostin, Why Should We Care About Social Justice?, 37 HASTINGS 
CENTER REP. 3, 3 (2007). 
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D. What Ethics Teaches Us 
Utilitarianism, equal chances, and the best outcome for the least 
well off constitute three distinct approaches to distributive justice.  
These ethical theories provide no clear, single answer to the question 
of how emergency planners and responders should prioritize the needs 
of various populations and to whom resources should be allocated in 
the face of scarcity.  Because there are no clear answers to these 
complex moral questions, the optimal approach is to minimize the 
need for difficult ethical choices, as I argue below. 
The utilitarian goal of maximizing the net benefit to society may be 
intuitively appealing, especially in the context of disasters.128  
However, alternative conceptions of distributive justice also exist.  
These promote egalitarianism129 or emphasize the needs of the 
disadvantaged.130  Many commentators argue vigorously that 
considerable resources should be invested in assisting vulnerable 
individuals such as the poor, institutionalized, and disabled, because 
they are the least able to withstand the hardships caused by 
catastrophic events.131 
Even some proponents of a utilitarian approach find it unethical to 
consider certain vulnerabilities as factors that influence resource 
allocation, and thus they offer a hybrid form of utilitarianism.  For 
example, one article categorizes the following considerations as 
permissible for purposes of making emergency treatment decisions 
when faced with scarce resources:  likelihood, duration, and extent of 
benefit as well as urgency of need and amount of required resources.132  
 128 See RAWLS, supra note 119, at 20 (describing classical utilitarianism as teaching 
that “society is rightly ordered, and therefore just, when its major institutions are 
arranged so as to achieve the greatest net balance of satisfaction summed over all the 
individuals belonging to it”); Robert Baker & Martin Strosberg, Triage and Equality:  
An Historical Reassessment of Utilitarian Analyses of Triage, 2 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 
103, 106 (1992). 
 129 See Baker & Strosberg, supra note 128, at 105 (discussing egalitarianism); supra 
Part II.B. (discussing equal chances theory).  Egalitarianism means treating all 
members of society equally.  See Baker & Strosberg, supra note 128, at 105. 
 130 See supra Part II.C. 
 131 See JONATHAN WOLFF & AVNER DE-SHALIT, DISADVANTAGE 3 (2007) (reporting on 
convergence of views that ideal policy is to “identify the worst off and take 
appropriate steps so that their position can be improved”); Gostin, supra note 127, at 3 
(asserting that “[s]ocial justice demands more than fair distribution of benefits and 
burdens in extreme health emergencies” and that failure to adequately support 
disadvantaged will “undermine[] social cohesion”); Uscher-Pines et al., supra note 6, 
at 33 (emphasizing that pandemic is likely to “exacerbate existing social and economic 
inequalities” and is thus “an urgent matter of social justice”); supra Part II.C. 
 132 Pesik et al., supra note 101, at 644. 
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However, the authors warn that the following factors should not be 
deemed relevant:  “[a]ge, ethnicity, or sex”; “[t]alents, abilities, 
disabilities, or deformities”; “[s]ocioeconomic status, social worth, or 
political position”; “[c]oexistent conditions that do not affect short-
term prognosis”; “[d]rug or alcohol abuse”; and “[a]ntisocial or 
aggressive behaviors.”133  Accordingly, decision makers pursuing the 
goal of maximizing the net benefit to society would focus on short-
term outcomes, prioritizing based on resources, need, and benefit 
considerations but not based on value judgments concerning who is 
deserving of care or who will live the most valuable lives in the future. 
A careful study of American law reveals many instances in which we 
reject the utilitarian approach.  American society has already elected to 
expend disproportionate resources on assisting the disadvantaged, and 
thus it is evident that  doing so is politically feasible.  For example, a 
large percentage of health care spending occurs at the end of life, often 
out of the publicly funded Medicare program, when there is little hope 
of longevity or a long-term high quality of life.134  Likewise, 
Medicaid135 and the State Children’s Health Insurance Program 
(“SCHIP”)136 provide health benefits for the impoverished at public 
expense, while other Americans must pay out of pocket for insurance 
policies or remain uninsured.137  The Americans with Disabilities 
Act138 requires reasonable accommodations for individuals with 
disabilities, even when these impose expenditures upon private 
 133 Id. 
 134 See Micah Hartman et al., U.S. Health Spending by Age, Selected Years Through 
2004, 27 HEALTH AFF. w1, w2 (2007) (stating that per capita spending for those age 85 
and older was 5.7 percent higher than spending by working-age individuals in 2004); 
Christopher Hogan et al., Medicare Beneficiaries’ Costs of Care in the Last Year of Life, 
20 HEALTH AFF. 188, 190 (2001) (reporting that “spending in the last year of life 
accounted for 27.4% of all Medicare outlays for the elderly”); Donald R. Hoover et al., 
Medical Expenditures During the Last Year of Life:  Findings From the 1992-1996 
Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey, 37 HEALTH SERVS. RES. 1625, 1631, 1634 (2002) 
(finding that average annual medical expenditures for Medicare patients’ last year of 
life was $37,581 in 1996 dollars, compared to $7,365 for nonterminal years).  
 135 Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, Medicaid Program — General 
Information, http://www.cms.hhs.gov/MedicaidGenInfo (last visited Feb. 21, 2009). 
 136 Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, Low Cost Health Insurance for 
Families and Children Overview, http://www.cms.hhs.gov/LowCostHealthInsFam 
Child/05OriginalSCHIPStatePlan.asp (last visited Mar. 23, 2009).  
 137 Wideman v. Shallowford Cmty. Hosp., 826 F.2d 1030, 1032 (11th Cir. 1987) 
(explaining that there is “no general right, based upon either the Constitution or 
federal statutes, to the provision of medical treatment and services by a state or 
municipality”). 
 138 Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-213 (2000). 
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businesses.139  Similarly, the Individuals with Disabilities Education 
Act (“IDEA”)140 requires public schools to provide special education 
services to children with certain mental and physical disabilities, even 
though special services are not legally mandated for others, such as 
gifted students.141  These examples illustrate a profound commitment 
to the vulnerable. 
Nevertheless, this Article does not attempt to resolve the challenging 
normative question of whether, in the face of extreme scarcity during 
an emergency, resources should be allocated disproportionately to the 
vulnerable while others are allowed to suffer greater deprivation as a 
result.  Rather, I argue that society should focus significant attention 
on vulnerable populations during emergency planning processes, 
when planners have the leisure of acting without the pressures of time, 
chaotic conditions, and an extreme dearth of resources.142 
Many complicated ethical decisions could in fact be avoided with 
appropriate emergency response preparation.  Response and recovery 
plans must include provisions to meet the needs of a wide spectrum of 
vulnerable groups.  An essential goal of emergency planning efforts 
should be to minimize unanticipated and complicated resource 
allocation problems involving the disadvantaged and vulnerable.143   
Moreover, disaster readiness for the general population and disaster 
readiness for the vulnerable are mutually beneficial goals.  The best 
outcomes for the vulnerable are most likely to be achieved with 
optimal preparation for those without special needs.  The more 
prepared and well equipped the general population is to react 
appropriately during emergencies and the more the healthy and strong 
can care for themselves, the more likely it is that resources will be 
available for the acute needs of the disadvantaged.  Advance planning 
and preparedness initiatives for all populations should aim to curtail 
the need for difficult moral choices and for sacrificing some victims for 
the sake of others. 
 139 See id. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv); infra text accompanying note 197. 
 140 Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-82 (2006) 
(originally enacted as Education of the Handicapped Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-230, 
tit. VI, 84 Stat. 175 (1971)). 
 141 Id.§ 1400 (setting forth findings and purposes section); id. § 1411 (authorizing 
appropriation for purposes of providing special education to children with 
disabilities); 34 C.F.R. § 300.101 (2008) (establishing requirement for free 
appropriate public education for children with disabilities). 
 142 See supra note 4 and accompanying text (explaining that federal government 
has invested over $10 billion in emergency preparedness initiatives since 2001). 
 143 See infra Part IV (detailing recommendations designed to promote achievement 
of this goal). 
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III. THE LAW AND VULNERABLE POPULATIONS 
The U.S. Constitution, federal law, and state statutes establish 
numerous obligations to protect vulnerable groups.  Several of these are 
emergency response laws that specifically address disaster response and 
preparedness for the disadvantaged.  Emergency relief planners and 
responders must recognize and be guided by these mandates.  This Part 
focuses on a variety of general and disaster-specific federal and state 
provisions that establish nondiscrimination directives and affirmative 
duties to accommodate the needs of particular at-risk groups. 
A. General Legal Protections for the Vulnerable 
Many legal provisions establish general protections for a variety of 
vulnerable groups.  These protections apply both in ordinary times 
and in disasters.  Below I analyze federal constitutional and statutory 
provisions, including the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, the Eighth Amendment, the Americans with Disabilities 
Act, the Rehabilitation Act, and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964.  I also analyze state constitutional and statutory laws and tort 
theory, all of which generally protect the vulnerable. 
1. Federal Protections 
Federal protections for the disadvantaged flow from both 
constitutional provisions and federal statutes.  I analyze the content 
and efficacy of these safeguards below, turning first to constitutional 
law and then to statutory law. 
a. Constitutional Provisions 
The Equal Protection Clause and the Eighth Amendment are the 
principal sources of constitutional protection for the vulnerable.  
While plaintiffs have asserted many claims based on these 
Amendments, constitutional jurisprudence establishes significant 
obstacles to successful litigation.  Despite these obstacles, 
constitutional mandates serve as an important guide for emergency 
planners and responders. 
(1) The Equal Protection Clause  
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
U.S. Constitution provides that no state shall “deny to any person 
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within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”144  The 
Supreme Court has ruled that the equal protection mandate applies to 
both state and federal governmental entities.145  This mandate in 
principle prohibits group-based discrimination by the government.146 
The Equal Protection Clause most clearly prohibits race-based 
discrimination by the government.  During the 1970s and 1980s, 
minority communities brought several successful federal equal 
protection challenges against municipalities based upon inequitable 
distribution of public services.  In Hawkins v. Town of Shaw,147 the 
plaintiffs alleged that African Americans occupied nearly ninety-eight 
percent of homes adjacent to unpaved streets in the town; that ninety-
seven percent of homes without sanitary sewer service were in 
African-American neighborhoods; and that all new mercury vapor 
street lighting fixtures were installed in white neighborhoods.148  Based 
on these facts, the Fifth Circuit found that the town had violated the 
Equal Protection Clause by providing plaintiffs with inferior 
governmental services.149  Similarly, in Ammons v. Dade City, Florida,150 
the Eleventh Circuit held that the City’s intentional discrimination in 
the provision of street paving, resurfacing, maintenance, and storm 
water drainage facilities to black and white communities constituted 
an equal protection violation.151  These precedents demonstrate that 
plaintiffs can assert successful equal protection claims in cases of 
serious, intentional governmental discrimination.  Thus, if authorities 
deliberately underserve or mistreat a minority community, such as 
African Americans, during an emergency because of race, that group 
could have a valid equal protection claim. 
Liability for violations of the Equal Protection Clause is not limited 
to  governmental agencies.  State officials can be sued in their 
individual capacities for violating constitutional and civil rights under 
42 U.S.C. § 1983.152  That section provides that “[e]very person who, 
 144 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see also U.S. CONST. amend. V (stating that no 
person shall “be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law”). 
 145 See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 498-99 (1954). 
 146 Daniel P. Tokaji, First Amendment Equal Protection:  On Discretion, Inequality, 
and Participation, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2409, 2422 (2003) (“Race discrimination is the 
archetype of the group-based discriminations that the Equal Protection Clause was 
enacted to forbid.”). 
 147 437 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971).  
 148 Id. at 1288. 
 149 Id. 
 150 783 F.2d 982 (11th Cir. 1986). 
 151 Id. at 983-84. 
 152 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000). 
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under color of any statute, ordinance, [or] regulation . . . of any 
State . . . subjects . . . any citizen . . . to the deprivation of any rights, 
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall 
be liable to the party injured.”153  The Supreme Court has held that § 
1983 applies to federal officials as well.154 
However, litigants asserting constitutional violations face significant 
challenges.  First, state and federal entities and their employees often 
enjoy immunity protection.  The Eleventh Amendment provides that 
private citizens cannot sue states for damages in federal court.155  This 
principle extends to constitutional claims in state court156 and to 
agencies and other arms of the state.157  All suits for damages or 
retroactive relief against state governments are barred by the 
Amendment unless they are brought by a state or the federal 
government,158 though Eleventh Amendment immunity does not 
extend to local government entities.159  Likewise, the doctrine of 
federal sovereign immunity protects the United States from being sued 
without its consent.160  Furthermore, the defense of qualified 
immunity shields federal and state government officials who are 
performing discretionary functions in their official capacities from 
liability for civil damages unless their conduct violates “clearly 
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable 
person would have known.”161  Immunity and qualified immunity thus 
constitute significant barriers to recovery for constitutional claims. 
 153 Id. 
 154 See Bivens v. Six Unnamed Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 395 (1970) (allowing for 
damages to redress Fourth Amendment violations by federal officials). 
 155 U.S. CONST. amend. XI.  The text reads as follows:  “The Judicial power of the 
United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, 
commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another 
State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.”   
 156 Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712 (1999) (holding that “the powers delegated 
to Congress under Article I of the United States Constitution do not include the power 
to subject nonconsenting States to private suits for damages in state courts”). 
 157 Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974); Ford Motor Co. v. Dep’t of 
Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 463 (1945); RICHARD H. FALLON ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S 
THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 985 (5th ed. 2003). 
 158 JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 49 (6th ed. 2000); 
see Alden, 527 U.S. 754; Carlos Manuel Vazquesz, What Is Eleventh Amendment 
Immunity?, 106 YALE L.J. 1683, 1685-86 (1997). 
 159 Monell v. N.Y. Dep’t. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). 
 160 FALLON ET AL., supra note 157, at 1001. 
 161 See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982); see also Davis v. Scherer, 
468 U.S. 183, 191 (1984) (stating that “[w]hether an official may prevail in his 
qualified immunity defense depends upon the objective reasonableness of [his] 
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In addition, plaintiffs must assert intentional discrimination rather 
than disparate impact.  Policies or actions that have only a disparate 
impact on a particular group do not violate the Equal Protection 
Clause.162 
Finally, courts do not analyze all unequal treatment cases in the same 
manner under constitutional standards.  Governmental classifications 
based on race, national origin, or alienage are subject to strict scrutiny 
by the courts.163  All other types of classifications receive lower levels of 
review.  For example, courts review sex-based differential treatment 
under intermediate scrutiny.164  And classifications based on age and 
disability are subject to “rational basis” review — the government must 
show only that such classifications constitute “rational means to serve a 
legitimate end.”165  Plaintiffs asserting claims that will be assessed 
under the rational basis standard thus face particularly significant 
obstacles to successful litigation. 
Still, while litigants may have difficulty prevailing in damages suits 
against governmental entities and employees, the Hawkins and 
Ammons cases166 demonstrate that plaintiff victories are possible.  
Furthermore, regardless of potential litigation outcomes, the Equal 
Protection Clause articulates a clear antidiscrimination principle that 
should guide governmental authorities, including those charged with 
emergency preparedness and response. 
(2) The Eighth Amendment 
The Eighth Amendment prohibits the infliction of “cruel and 
unusual punishment[]”167 and governs the treatment of incarcerated 
individuals.168  While the general population has no right to health 
care or to have other services provided by the government,169 prisoners 
conduct as measured by reference to clearly established law”). 
 162 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) (“[O]ur cases have not 
embraced the proposition that a law or other official act, without regard to whether it 
reflects a racially discriminatory purpose, is unconstitutional solely because it has a 
racially disproportionate impact.”). 
 163 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985). 
 164 Id. at 441. 
 165 Id. at 441-42 (applying rational basis review to invalidate requirement of 
special-use permit for group home for mentally retarded individuals). 
 166 See supra notes 147-51 and accompanying text. 
 167 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
 168 Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 
106 (1976). 
 169 Wideman v. Shallowford Cmty. Hosp., 826 F.2d 1030, 1032 (11th Cir. 1987) 
(explaining that there is “no general right, based upon either the Constitution or 
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are entitled to food, clothing, shelter, and medical treatment because 
they are not free to obtain these necessities for themselves.170  These 
entitlements are not suspended during disasters.  As the Supreme 
Court has explained: 
[W]hen the State by the affirmative exercise of its power so 
restrains an individual’s liberty that it renders him unable to 
care for himself, and at the same time fails to provide for his 
basic human needs — e.g., food, clothing, shelter, medical 
care, and reasonable safety — it  transgresses the substantive 
limits on state action set by the Eighth Amendment . . . .171 
The Amendment embodies “broad and idealistic concepts of dignity, 
civilized standards, humanity, and decency.”172 
Like those subject to equal protection violations, prisoners who feel 
they are the victims of cruel and unusual punishment may bring 
constitutional claims.  Under the Eighth Amendment, prisoners may 
challenge their treatment in two ways.  First, they may challenge 
specific conduct by prison officials, and second, they may challenge 
prison policies or regulations.  Neither is easy to accomplish.  
Prisoners aggrieved by specific conduct must show that the conditions 
of incarceration posed substantial risks of serious harm and that 
prison officials demonstrated “deliberate indifference” to their health 
or safety.173  Inmates must establish that prison officials were aware of 
and understood the risk at issue and disregarded it.174  A showing of 
“deliberate indifference” requires more than evidence of negligence 
but less than proof of acts or omissions intended to cause harm or 
perpetrated with knowledge that harm would result.175   
Likewise, claims based on allegedly unconstitutional prison policies 
face significant hurdles.  Even if policies infringe upon prisoners’ 
constitutional rights, courts will uphold them so long as they are 
reasonably related to the government’s legitimate penological 
interests.176  Despite this obstacle, inmates have prevailed in several 
federal statutes, to the provision of medical treatment and services by a state or 
municipality”). 
 170 DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 200 (1989). 
 171 Id.  
 172 Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 579 (8th Cir. 1968). 
 173 Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). 
 174 Id. at 837. 
 175 Id. at 835. 
 176 Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987) (involving challenges to regulation 
concerning inmate-to-inmate correspondence, which was upheld, and inmate 
marriage regulation, which was not).  In order to analyze a regulation’s 
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cases challenging prison policies.  For example, in Tillery v. Owen,177 
the Third Circuit found that prison conditions violated the Eighth 
Amendment when prisoners were double-celled in “an overcrowded, 
dilapidated and unsanitary” facility.178  Similarly, in French v. Owens,179 
the plaintiffs alleged that they were subjected to overcrowding and 
mechanical restraints; that they received inadequate health care, food, 
and recreation; and that the prison had an insufficient number of 
safety personnel and failed to comply with fire and occupational safety 
regulations.180  The Seventh Circuit found that many of these 
conditions constituted cruel and unusual punishment that was 
unacceptable under the Eighth Amendment.181 
In the context of emergency preparedness, the failure to develop and 
execute emergency plans may constitute an Eighth Amendment 
violation.  Concededly, ordinary negligence by prison authorities is 
not a constitutional violation, and most prison regulations are upheld 
as sufficiently linked to valid penological goals.182  But if prison 
authorities do not have or do not follow established emergency plans 
and abandon prisons en masse, leaving inmates to fend for themselves, 
as happened after Hurricane Katrina, an Eighth Amendment violation 
reasonableness, a court must consider the following four factors:  
(1) there must be a valid, rational connection between the prison regulation 
and the legitimate governmental interest put forward to justify it; (2) the 
court should determine whether there are alternative means of exercising the 
constitutional right that remain open to the inmates; (3) the court is to 
consider the impact that accommodation of the asserted constitutional right 
will have on guards, other inmates, and on the allocation of prison 
resources; and (4) the court should assess whether there are ready 
alternatives to the prison regulation; the absence of such ready alternatives 
suggests that the regulation is reasonable while their existence may be 
evidence of the opposite. 
Walker v. Sumner, 917 F.2d 382, 385 (9th Cir. 1990) (quoting Safley, 482 U.S. at 89-
91) (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
 177 907 F.2d 418 (3d Cir. 1990). 
 178 Id. at 420. 
 179 777 F.2d 1250 (7th Cir. 1985). 
 180 Id. at 1251. 
 181 See id. at 1258 (affirming district court’s judgment for plaintiffs based on 
overcrowding, double-celling, mechanical restraints, and inadequate medical care, 
kitchen services, and correction officers, and vacating and remanding lower-court 
judgment insofar as it addressed exercise, recreation, protective custody, and fire and 
occupational safety); see also McCord v. Maggio, 927 F.2d 844, 847 (5th Cir. 1991) 
(finding that inmate’s Eight Amendment rights were violated when he was forced to 
live in sewage and filthy water). 
 182 See supra notes 173-76 and accompanying text. 
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may exist.  Similarly, if prison authorities implement irrational policies 
that have no penological goals and endanger prisoners’ lives during an 
emergency, courts may find them liable for constitutional violations.183 
b. Statutory Protections 
Several federal statutes establish antidiscrimination mandates that 
apply to emergency planning and response activities.  These laws, 
which prohibit discrimination based on disability, race, color, and 
national origin, include the Americans with Disabilities Act, the 
Rehabilitation Act, and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, all of 
which are analyzed below. 
(1) The Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act 
The Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) prohibits disability-
based discrimination.184  The ADA Amendments Act of 2008185 
clarified the definition of “disability” and instructed that the term be 
interpreted in a broad and inclusive manner.186  The Rehabilitation Act 
of 1973187 provides further protections to the disabled.  Together, 
these acts forbid public and private entities from discriminating 
against those with disabilities.  Moreover, these acts reflect a legislative 
determination that society should not only eschew discrimination but 
also furnish accommodations for the needs of the disabled. 
The ADA features separate titles that address discrimination by 
governmental entities and private businesses.  Title II of the ADA 
governs the conduct of public services.188  Qualified individuals with 
disabilities189 may not be denied the benefits of programs, activities, 
and services, such as public transportation, provided by public 
 183 See Robbins, supra note 73, at 20-40 (arguing that Eighth Amendment provides 
prisoners with plausible mechanism by which to challenge mistreatment such as that 
suffered during and after Hurricane Katrina). 
 184 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-213 (2000). 
 185 Pub. L. No.110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008) (codified at 29 U.S.C.A. § 705, 42 
U.S.C.A. §§ 12101-103, 12111-114, 12201, 12205a-213). 
 186 42 U.S.C.A. § 12102(4) (2008) (“The definition of disability in this Act shall be 
construed in favor of broad coverage of individuals under this Act, to the maximum 
extent permitted by the terms of this Act.”). 
 187 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2006). 
 188 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-165 (2000). 
 189 In the Title II context, qualified individuals are those “who, with or without 
reasonable modifications . . . meet[] the essential eligibility requirements for the 
receipt of services or the participation in programs or activities provided by a public 
entity.”  Id. § 12131. 
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entities, nor can they be subjected to discrimination by these entities 
because of their disabilities.190  Title II requires public entities to make 
their services readily accessible to individuals with disabilities unless 
the actions required to achieve this goal would “result in a 
fundamental alteration in the nature of a service, program, or activity 
or in undue financial and administrative burdens.”191  Finally, Title II 
provides aggrieved individuals with a private cause of action.192 
Title III of the ADA extends similar mandates to many private 
entities.  This Title addresses the treatment of individuals with 
disabilities by “public accommodations” and prohibits disability-based 
discrimination in the provision of goods, services, and other benefits.193  
As defined in the ADA, “public accommodation” is a term of art 
referring to any private entity whose operations affect commerce.194  
This broad definition includes within its sweep much of the health care 
industry – pharmacies, insurance companies, health care providers, 
hospitals, and other service providers.195  This Title also covers public 
transportation services provided by private entities.196  Title III requires 
covered entities to modify their policies, procedures, architecture, and 
communication mechanisms to accommodate individuals with 
disabilities, unless doing so is not readily achievable.197  These 
modifications, for example, entail installing ramps for wheelchairs, 
furnishing TTY phone service for the hearing impaired, or changing 
attendance or break policies.  Like Title II, Title III provides a private 
cause of action for those whose rights are violated.198 
The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 preceded the ADA by many years, 
and it set an important, albeit somewhat narrow, precedent for 
protection of individuals with disabilities.  Section 504 of the Act199 
 190 Id. § 12132.  A “public entity” is defined as (1) a state or local government; (2) 
an instrumentality of a state or local government; or (3) the National Railroad 
Passenger Corporation and any other commuter authority.   Id. § 12131.  Damages 
have been allowed against states in Title II cases.  In Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 
533-34 (2004), the Supreme Court held that private citizens may sue a state under 
Title II of the ADA to enforce their right of access to a courthouse and that Eleventh 
Amendment immunity does not bar such an action.  
 191 28 C.F.R. § 35.150(a) (2008). 
 192 42 U.S.C. § 12133. 
 193 Id. § 12182 (2000). 
 194 See id. § 12181(7) (2000). 
 195 Id. § 12181(7)(F). 
 196 Id. § 12184 (2000). 
 197 See id. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv).  
 198 Id. § 12188 (2000). 
 199 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2006). 
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protects individuals with disabilities, though it covers different parties 
from those to which the ADA applies.  The law establishes that 
qualified individuals with disabilities200 may not, because of their 
disabilities, be excluded from, denied the benefits of, or subjected to 
discrimination by programs and activities that receive federal financial 
support and those conducted by an executive agency of the United 
States or the United States Postal Service.201 
These laws establish strong antidiscrimination and accommodation 
mandates for those with disabilities.  However, Congress has qualified 
these protections in two significant ways.  First, under the ADA and 
the Rehabilitation Act, covered entities need not accommodate 
individuals with disabilities if doing so would constitute an undue 
hardship.202  Second, Title III of the ADA and section 504 of the 
Rehabilitation Act establish that covered entities need not allow 
individuals who pose a direct threat to the health or safety of others to 
benefit from their goods or services.203  These qualifications constitute 
litigation barriers for some plaintiffs. 
Establishing violations of these laws by emergency responders will 
be particularly challenging.  Plaintiffs will need to prove that the 
alleged wrong was due specifically to their disabilities rather than to 
the chaos of a disaster and that the defendant could have 
accommodated their needs without undue hardship.204  Proving undue 
hardship during a disaster will likely be much easier for defendants 
than establishing this defense during ordinary times because a disaster 
will severely strain human and financial resources.  In addition, if 
treating a patient with HIV or tuberculosis under suboptimal 
emergency conditions would expose the provider or other patients to a 
significant risk of infection, doctors may be able to prove that a direct 
 200 Federal regulations define a qualified person under section 504 as “a 
handicapped person who meets the essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of 
. . . services.”  45 C.F.R. § 84.3(1)(4) (2008). 
 201 29 U.S.C. § 794(a); see also Modderno v. King, 82 F.3d 1059, 1060 (D.C. Cir. 
1996) (stating that Office of Personnel Management was subject to section 504 
because it was executive agency of United States). 
 202 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A); 28 C.F.R. § 35.150(a) (2008); id.  § 39.150(a)(2) 
(2008). 
 203 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(3) (defining “direct threat” as “a significant risk to the 
health or safety of others that cannot be eliminated by a modification of policies, 
practices, or procedures or by the provision of auxiliary aids or services”); see 29 
U.S.C. § 794(a)  (adopting definition of individual with disability provided in 29 
U.S.C. § 705(20) (2006), which includes discussion of direct threat); 28 C.F.R. § 
36.208 (2008). 
 204 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A) (establishing undue burden defense). 
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threat existed.205  Furthermore, precedent establishes that patients will 
not be successful in suing health care providers for ADA or 
Rehabilitation Act violations relating to good-faith medical treatment 
decisions.206 
In addition, policies concerning the allocation of medical resources 
that have a disparate impact on individuals with disabilities may not 
be actionable.  The Supreme Court rejected a disparate-impact 
challenge in Alexander v. Choate,207 which involved Tennessee’s 
reduction of the number of inpatient hospital days for which Medicaid 
would pay.208  Evaluating the restriction under the Rehabilitation Act, 
the Court upheld the State’s fourteen-day limitation even though 
individuals with disabilities often have more extensive medical needs 
than others.209  Since then, few disparate impact claims brought under 
the ADA or Rehabilitation Act have succeeded.210 
In spite of these obstacles, plaintiffs might be able to assert 
successful disability discrimination claims in some circumstances.  
First, they may succeed in cases of egregious misconduct or conduct 
based on stereotypes and groundless assumptions about the 
disabled.211  For example, if responders deem individuals with 
disabilities to be of low priority for triaging purposes simply because 
they have disabilities, they may violate disability rights statutes.212  
Second, aggrieved individuals might be successful in suits that allege 
deficient emergency response preparation.  If emergency readiness 
 205 See sources cited supra note 203.  
 206 Burger v. Bloomberg, 418 F.3d 882, 883 (8th Cir. 2005) (“[A] lawsuit under the 
Rehab Act or the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) cannot be based on medical 
treatment decisions . . . .”); Fitzgerald v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 403 F.3d 1134, 1144 
(10th Cir. 2005) (“[P]urely medical decisions . . . do not ordinarily fall within the 
scope of the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act.”). 
 207 469 U.S. 287 (1985). 
 208 Id. at 289. 
 209 Id. at 303-04. 
 210 Stewart J. Schwab & Steven L. Willborn, Reasonable Accommodation of 
Workplace Disabilities, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1197, 1240 n.101 (2003) (“[E]ven 
though the ADA explicitly recognizes disparate impact as a cognizable model of 
discrimination under the Act, almost no ADA disability disparate impact cases exist.”).  
But see Sunrise Dev., Inc. v. Town of Huntington, 62 F. Supp. 2d 762, 776-77 
(E.D.N.Y. 1999) (concluding that plaintiffs were likely to prevail on claim that zoning 
restrictions on assisted living facilities had disparate impact on disabled individuals). 
 211 See NANCY LEE JONES, AMERICAN LAW DIV., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE 
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT (ADA):  ALLOCATION OF SCARCE MEDICAL RESOURCES 
DURING A PANDEMIC 14 (2006), available at https://www.policyarchive.org/ 
bitstream/handle/10207/2809/RL33381_200060421.pdf?sequence=1.  
 212 Id. 
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planners ignore the needs of individuals with disabilities, plaintiffs 
who find themselves without means of evacuation, communication, or 
access to other services during an emergency might prevail.  Planners 
operating in the absence of the chaotic circumstances of an actual 
emergency could find it difficult to establish undue burden as a 
rationale for their failure to prepare for the needs of individuals with 
disabilities.  However, because of Eleventh Amendment immunity, 
federal sovereign immunity, and qualified immunity,213 plaintiffs may 
not be able to obtain monetary relief from governmental actors 
involved in emergency preparedness.214 
It is important to emphasize that the ADA and Rehabilitation Act 
establish a dual mandate of nondiscrimination and accommodation.215  
These laws require covered entities not only to eschew discrimination, 
but also to take affirmative steps to accommodate the needs of 
individuals with disabilities.  This dual commitment is particularly 
important in the context of emergencies, when individuals with 
physical and mental impairments have many special needs.216   
(2) Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
Whereas the ADA and Rehabilitation Acts protect individuals with 
disabilities from discrimination, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 prohibits racial discrimination, broadly defined.  The law 
prohibits programs or activities receiving federal funds from engaging 
 213 See supra notes 155-61 and accompanying text. 
 214 See United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151, 159 (2006) (“[I]nsofar as Title II 
creates a private cause of action for damages against the States for conduct that 
actually violates the Fourteenth Amendment, Title II validly abrogates state sovereign 
immunity.”); Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 530-31 (2004) (holding that private 
citizens may sue state under Title II of ADA to enforce their rights of access to 
courthouse and that Eleventh Amendment immunity does not bar such action).   
However, it is unclear whether damages could be obtained in Title II cases that do not 
allege a violation of fundamental rights.  See Michael Waterstone, A New Vision of 
Public Enforcement, 92 MINN. L. REV. 434, 465 (2007). 
 215 See supra notes 184-201 and accompanying text.   
 216 Several scholars have argued that the ADA’s current reasonable accommodation 
mandate is insufficient to meet the needs of individuals with disabilities and that 
further assistance or alternative models must be used to serve the needs of this 
population.  See generally Samuel Bagenstos, The Future of Disability Law, 114 YALE 
L.J. 1 (2004) (arguing for move to social welfare model to address needs of individuals 
with disabilities, including government assistance such as public funding and public 
health insurance); Satz, supra note 35 (arguing for blending of civil rights and social 
welfare approaches to disability rights); Michael Ashley Stein, Disability Human Rights, 
95 CAL. L. REV. 75 (2007) (developing “disability human rights paradigm”). 
2009] Preparing for Disaster 1527 
in discrimination on the basis of race, color, or national origin.217  
Federal regulations promulgated by a variety of agencies pursuant to 
Title VI prohibit not only intentional discrimination but also actions 
that have a disparate impact on covered groups.218  The statute features 
administrative enforcement provisions that allow federal agencies, 
such as the Department of Health and Human Services Office of Civil 
Rights,219 to enforce violations of the statute.220  In Alexander v. 
Sandoval,221 the Supreme Court held that plaintiffs do not have a 
private cause of action to litigate disparate-impact cases under Title 
VI.222  However, aggrieved individuals retain a private cause of action 
to challenge intentional violations of the statute.223 
Because it is very difficult to prove discriminatory intent, plaintiffs 
have rarely prevailed in disparate treatment cases under the statute.224  
Nevertheless, aggrieved individuals who believe that federally and 
state-funded programs deliberately denied disaster-related services to 
them because of their race, color, or national origin may seek relief 
under Title VI.  More importantly, regardless of litigation prospects, 
these programs should comply with the statutory directives and 
 217 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2000) (“No person in the United States shall, on the ground 
of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the 
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving 
Federal financial assistance.”). 
 218 See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 80.3(b)(2) (2008) (providing that recipients may not use 
“criteria or methods of administration which have the effect of subjecting individuals 
to discrimination”); see also Guardians Ass’n v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 463 U.S. 582, 592 
n.13 (1983) (noting that “every Cabinet department and about [40] federal agencies 
adopted Title VI regulations prohibiting disparate-impact discrimination”). 
 219 See Sara Rosenbaum & Joel Teitelbaum, Civil Rights Enforcement in the Modern 
Healthcare System:  Reinvigorating the Role of the Federal Government in the Aftermath of 
Alexander v. Sandoval, 3 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 215, 224 (2003). 
 220 Exec. Order No. 13,160, 65 Fed. Reg. 39,775 (June 23, 2000), reprinted in 42 
U.S.C. § 2000d app. At 4-401 to -403 (2000); Dayna Bowen Matthew, Disastrous 
Disasters:  Restoring Civil Rights Protections for Victims of the State in Natural Disasters, 
2 J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 213, 230 (2006) (stating that “private plaintiffs may 
prosecute intentional discrimination by bringing disparate treatment claims under 
Title VI, or plaintiffs may rely upon administrative enforcement through the Office for 
Civil Rights (OCR),” but noting that, “[o]ver the past decade . . . the OCR’s 
enforcement record has been lackluster, its staff has been reduced, and its budgets 
have been cut”). 
 221 532 U.S. 275 (2001). 
 222 Id. at 285. 
 223 See id. at 284; see also Derek W. Black, The Mysteriously Reappearing Cause of 
Action:  The Court’s Expanded Concept of Intentional Gender and Race Discrimination in 
Federally Funded Programs, 67 MD. L. REV. 358, 360-61 (2008). 
 224 See Rosenbaum & Teitelbaum, supra note 219, at 227-29. 
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ensure that they are not excluding protected groups from enjoying 
available benefits. 
2. State Protections 
Like the federal government, the states have enacted legal safeguards 
to protect the rights of the disadvantaged.  Many provisions, including 
state equal protection clauses, disability laws, and other 
antidiscrimination mandates, parallel federal laws.  In addition, under 
state common law, aggrieved individuals can sue for recovery based on 
tort theory.  This subpart examines the protections to which 
vulnerable populations are entitled under state law. 
a. Constitutional and Statutory Provisions 
Many state constitutions establish equality mandates.225  Fifteen 
states have equal protection provisions that are similar to the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.226  Other states 
have more specific constitutional provisions, such as ones that 
prohibit discrimination based on sex or against individuals exercising 
their civil rights.227 
All fifty states have statutes that address disability rights, though 
they vary in scope and content.  In general, these state laws prohibit 
discrimination based on disability and require that individuals with 
disabilities enjoy access to goods and services and receive needed 
accommodations.228 
 225 See Jeffrey M. Shaman, The Evolution of Equality in State Constitutional Law, 34 
RUTGERS L.J. 1013, 1055 (2003); Robert F. Williams, Equality Guarantees in State 
Constitutional Law, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1195, 1196-97 (1985) . 
 226 Shaman, supra note 225, at 1055 (listing fifteen constitutional provisions). 
 227 Williams, supra note 225, at 1196 (stating that majority of state constitutions do 
not include equal protection clauses, but rather various equality or nondiscrimination 
provisions that vary in scope and content). 
 228 ALA. CODE §§ 21-7-2, -3 (LexisNexis 2006); ALASKA STAT. §§ 18.80.200, .230, 
.255, 35.10.015 (2006); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-1492.01-.05 (2004); ARK. CODE 
ANN.  §§ 16-123-314(c), 20-14-301 to -303 (2005 & 2006); CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 51(f), 
54, 54.1 (West 2007); CAL. GOV’T CODE § 4450 (West Supp. 2008); COLO. REV. STAT. 
§§ 9-5-103, 24-34-601, 24-34-801 (2007); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 29-269, 46a-64, 
46a-71 (West 2004 & Supp. 2008); DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 6, §§ 4501, 4504 (1999), tit. 
16, §§ 9501, 9502 (1995), tit. 29, § 7306 (1997); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 2-1402.01, .31, 
.73, 7-1001, 7-1002 (LexisNexis 2008 & Supp. 2008); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 413.08(3), 
553.501-.513, 760.08 (West Supp. 2008); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 30-3-1 to -9 (2007); 
HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 103-50, 347-13, 368-1.5, 489-3 (LexisNexis 1993 & Supp. 
2007); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 56-702, -703, 67-5909 (2002 & 2006); 775 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 5/5-102, 30/2, 30/3 (West 2001 & Supp. 2008); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 16-
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In addition, some states have laws that parallel Title VI and prohibit 
facilities, programs, and activities receiving state funding from 
discriminating based on particular classifications.  Under these 
statutes, state funding recipients generally may not discriminate based 
on disability, sex, age, race, color, religion, national origin, or 
ancestry.229 
32-3-1-2, 22-9-1-2, 22-13-4-1, 22-13-4-1.5 (West 2005 & Supp. 2007); IOWA CODE 
ANN. §§ 216.7, 216C.3, 216C.4 (West 2000 & Supp. 2008); KAN. STAT. ANN.  §§ 39-
1101, 44-1009(c), 58-1303, 58-1304 (2000, 2005 & Supp. 2007); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 198B.260, 258.500, 344.120 (West 2006); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:1733, 40:1748, 
46:1953, 46:2254, 49:146 (West 1999, 2001 & 2003); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, §§ 
4591-92, tit. 17, § 1312, tit. 25, §§ 2701-02 (West 1964 & Supp. 2007); MD. CODE 
ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. §§ 2-501 to -511 (West 2006); MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 
12-202 (West 2003); MD. CODE ANN., HUMAN SERVICES §§ 7-702, 7-704 (West 2007); 
MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, § 5(b) (2007); MASS. CONST. amend. CXIV; MASS. GEN. LAWS 
ANN. ch. 22, § 13A, ch. 272, § 98 (West 2000 & Supp. 2008); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. 
§§  37.1102, .1302, .2302, 125.1351, .1361 (West 2001 & 2006); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 
256C.02, 363A.02, .11, .12, 471.464 -.467 (West 2004, 2007 & 2008); MISS. CODE 
ANN. §§ 43-6-3 to -5, -101 to -125 (West 2008); MO. ANN. STAT.  §§ 8.610-.657, 
209.150, 213.065 (West 2000 & 2004); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 49-1-102, 49-2-304, -
308, 49-4-202, -211, 50-60-201(4) (2007); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 20-126, -127, 81-5, 147 
(1997 & 2003); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 338.180, 651.070 (LexisNexis 2004 & Supp. 
2007); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 155:39-b to -d, 167-C:1 to -D:1, 275-C:14, 354-A:16 to 
-A:17 (LexisNexis 2002, 2008 & Supp. 2007); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 10:5-4, -4.1, -12(f) 
(West Supp. 2008); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§  28-1-7(F), -7-3 (West 2000); N.Y. PUB. BLDGS. 
LAW §§ 50-51 (McKinney 1996); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296(2) (McKinney Supp. 2008); 
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 168-2, -3, 168A-6, -7, -9 (2007); N.D. CENT. CODE  §§ 14-02.4-14, -
15, 48-01.2-24 (Supp. 2007); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3781.111, 4112.02(G) (West 
2006 & Supp. 2007); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 1402, tit. 61, § 11 (West 2008 & 
Supp. 2008); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 659A.142(3), .142(4), 447.210-.310 (2007); 43 PA. 
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 953 (West Supp. 2008); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 37-8-15, -15.1, 40-9.1-
1, 42-87-2, -3 (1997 & 2006); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 10-5-250, 43-33-10, -520, -530 
(1976 & Supp. 2007); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 5-14-12, -13, 20-13-23, -23.1, -24 (1994 
& 1995); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 68-120-202, -204 (2006); TEX. REV. HUM. RES. CODE 
ANN. §§ 121.001, .003 (Vernon 2001 & Supp. 2007); TEX. REV. GOV’T CODE ANN. §§ 
469.003, .052 (Vernon 2004); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 26-29-1 to -3, 62A-5b-103 (2007 & 
Supp. 2007); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4502(c), tit. 20, § 2902 (Supp. 2007); VA. CODE 
ANN. §§ 51.5-40, -44 (2005); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 19.27.031, 49.60.215, 
70.84.010,.92.110 - .150 (West 2002, 2005 & 2008); W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 5-11-9(6), 
5-15-4 (LexisNexis 2008); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 101.13, 106.52(3) (West 2004 & Supp. 
2007); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 16-6-501, 35-13-201 (2007). 
 229 HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 368-1.5 (1993) (noting that no otherwise qualified 
person with disabilities shall be subjected to discrimination by any program or activity 
receiving state financial assistance); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 344.120, .130, .145 (West 
2006) (stating facilities supported directly or indirectly by government funds may not 
discriminate on basis of disability, religion, race, national origin, and sex); LA. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 46:2254 (West 2003) (stating no disabled person shall be subjected to 
discrimination by any program or activity that receives state financial assistance); MO. 
ANN. STAT. §§ 213.010(15)(e), .065 (West 2004) (establishing that all persons within 
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These equality, disability discrimination, and civil rights 
constitutional and statutory provisions, like their federal counterparts, 
establish important guiding principles for policy makers, including 
emergency planners and responders.  In some cases, they may also 
create opportunities for aggrieved individuals to pursue remedial 
action through litigation.230  However, plaintiffs bringing cases under 
state law are likely to face immunity and proof problems similar to 
those that often hinder litigation under the parallel federal 
provisions.231 
b. Common Law Remedies Through Tort 
Another avenue for litigation is tort theory.  Plaintiffs who are 
dissatisfied with the treatment they received in the wake of a disaster 
may bring negligence suits against emergency planners.  The standard 
of care in any negligence case is fact specific and depends on the 
particular circumstances at issue.  The court must assess whether the 
defendant “proceed[ed] with such reasonable caution as a prudent 
man would have exercised under such circumstances.”232 
state are entitled to full and equal use of any place of public accommodation without 
discrimination based on race, color, religion, national origin, sex, ancestry, or 
disability and defining “public accommodation” as including any public facility 
receiving state funds); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 20-132, -133 (1997) (establishing that all 
persons within state are entitled to full and equal enjoyment of places of public 
accommodation, without discrimination based on age, sex, national origin, or religion 
and defining “public accommodation” as including any public facility supported in 
whole or in part by public funds); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, §§ 1401-02 (West 2008) 
(providing that it is discriminatory practice “to deny the full and equal enjoyment of 
the goods, services, accommodations, facilities, privileges and advantages of a place of 
public accommodation because of race, religion, sex, origin, age or handicap” and that 
places of public accommodation are establishments supported by government funds); 
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 13-7-2, -3 (2005) (establishing that businesses and places of 
public accommodation may not discriminate against individuals based on “race, color, 
sex, religion, ancestry or national origin” and defining “public accommodation” as 
including any facility that receives substantial government support). 
 230 See sources cited supra note 229. 
 231 See supra notes 162-61, 204-05, 222, and accompanying text. 
 232 Vaughan v. Menlove, (1837) 132 Eng. Rep. 490, 492 (C.P.) (affirming jury 
verdict for plaintiff who was injured when fire that began in defendant’s haystack 
burnt down his house); see also Barry R. Furrow, The Problem of the Sports Doctor:  
Serving Two (Or Is It Three or Four?) Masters, 50 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 165, 182 (2005) 
(“[S]tandard of care is defined by reference to a physician using the knowledge, skill, 
and care ordinarily possessed and employed by members of the profession in good 
standing, good medical practice within the area of specialty practice, and reasonable, 
customary, accepted care under the circumstances.”). 
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Because the standard of care varies based on the particular 
circumstances at issue, treatment that is adequate for healthy adults 
may be negligent when provided to vulnerable people with special 
needs, such as children, elderly persons, or disabled individuals.233  
Thus, emergency response personnel and planners should be aware 
that the treatment expected under the standard of care for vulnerable 
populations may be different from what is appropriate for others.  
Consequently, plaintiffs with special needs may find it easier to prove 
negligence or gross negligence234 because response protocols that are 
acceptable for the general population could be egregiously inadequate 
for vulnerable individuals.235   
As is the case under statutory law, however, many parties, such as 
governmental actors and volunteers, will enjoy various degrees of 
immunity for tort actions associated with discretionary good faith 
emergency response activities.236  Immunity, however, generally is not 
granted for gross negligence and willful misconduct.237  Furthermore, 
officials may be exposed to liability if they are not performing 
discretionary functions, for example, when they fail to follow clear 
instructions in detailed emergency plans that do not require 
significant judgment calls on the part of implementers.238  The issue of 
liability and immunity in public health emergencies is discussed at 
length in my prior work and will not be repeated here.239 
B. Emergency Statutes Addressing the Needs of Vulnerable Populations 
The constitutional, statutory, and common law protections 
discussed above240 are general mandates that should not be suspended 
during emergencies.  However, because a number of legislatures have 
recognized that the disadvantaged will have acute needs during and 
after disasters, some emergency laws include provisions specifically 
addressing the treatment of vulnerable populations.  This subpart 
 233 See supra Part I (discussing needs of various vulnerable populations). 
 234 See supra note 66 (defining gross negligence). 
 235 See supra Part I.D (discussing special needs of children). 
 236 Sharona Hoffman, Responders’ Responsibility:  Liability and Immunity in Public 
Health Emergencies, 96 GEO. L.J. 1913, 1937-49 (2008).   
 237 Id. 
 238 See Gordon v. City of Henderson, 766 S.W.2d 784, 786-87 (Tenn. 1989) 
(preserving negligence claims alleging that firemen were intoxicated and absent from 
their duty station because these failures did not fall within “discretionary function” 
exception of Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act). 
 239 Hoffman, supra note 236, at 1913-69. 
 240 See supra Part III.A. 
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surveys federal and state emergency statutes that establish relevant 
mandates for the planning, response, and recovery phases of disasters. 
1. Federal Law and Executive Action 
The Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act was passed by 
Congress in December of 2006 in reaction to the failures of the 
Hurricane Katrina response efforts.241 The law added a provision 
entitled “At-risk individuals” to the Public Health Service Act.242  It 
considers the “public health and medical needs of at-risk 
individuals”243 to be a national goal.  The Act defines “at-risk 
individuals” as “children, pregnant women, senior citizens and other 
individuals who have special needs in the event of a public health 
emergency, as determined by the Secretary of Health.”244  The Act also 
allows for, but does not require, the appointment of a Department of 
Health and Human Services (“HHS”) “Director of At-Risk Individuals” 
for emergency preparedness purposes.245  Beyond these general 
directives, the statute provides little guidance as to how to achieve its 
preparedness goal.246  
 241 Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-417, 120 
Stat. 2831 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); James G. Hodge et al., The 
Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act:  Improving Public Health Emergency 
Response, 297 JAMA 1708, 1708 (2007). 
 242 42 U.S.C. § 300hh-16 (2006).  
 243 Id. § 300hh-16(1).  
 244 Id. § 300hh-1(b)(4)(B) (2006). 
 245 Id. § 300hh-16. 
 246 The provision instructs that the Secretary and a possible appointee, the Director 
of At-Risk Individuals, shall: 
(2) assist other Federal agencies responsible for planning for, responding 
to, and recovering from public health emergencies in addressing the needs of 
at-risk individuals; 
(3) provide guidance to and ensure that recipients of State and local public 
health grants include preparedness and response strategies and capabilities 
that take into account the medical and public health needs of at-risk 
individuals in the event of a public health emergency, as described in section 
247d-3a(b)(2)(A)(iii) of this title; 
(4) ensure that the contents of the strategic national stockpile take into 
account at-risk populations as described in section 300hh-10(b)(3)(B) of 
this title; 
(5) oversee the progress of the Advisory Committee on At-Risk Individuals 
and Public Health Emergencies established under section 247d-6(b)(2) of 
this title and make recommendations with a focus on opportunities for 
action based on the work of the Committee; 
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An older law, the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency 
Assistance Act (“Stafford Act”), enacted in 1988, establishes a broad 
nondiscrimination mandate to protect vulnerable populations.247  It 
enables the President to declare an emergency or major disaster.248  A 
federal emergency may be declared at the request of a governor249 or, in 
some circumstances, at the President’s own initiative.250  Section 308 of 
the Stafford Act251 empowers the President to issue regulations to 
govern the provision of federal assistance at the location of major 
disasters and emergencies.  These regulations, however, must ensure 
that authorities accomplish relief activities “without discrimination on 
the grounds of race, color, religion, nationality, sex, age, disability, 
English proficiency, or economic status.”252  Federal governmental 
entities and other organizations supplying or receiving disaster 
assistance must comply with the regulations that the President 
promulgates.253  Section 308, however, does not establish a private cause 
of action for violations, and no court thus far has found that an implied 
cause of action exists.254  Nevertheless, its nondiscrimination mandate is 
expansive, extending to English proficiency and economic status, 
classifications that are not covered by other federal laws and not 
traditionally deemed to be protected within the American legal system. 
In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, Congress passed the Post-
Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006, which created 
the position of Disability Coordinator in FEMA to aid in disaster 
(6) oversee curriculum development for the public health and medical 
response training program on medical management of casualties, as it 
concerns at-risk individuals as described in subparagraphs (A) through (C) 
of section 247d-16(a)(2) of this title; [and] 
(7) disseminate novel and best practices of outreach to and care of at-risk 
individuals before, during, and following public health emergencies. 
Id. 
 247 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121-5207 (2000). 
 248 Id. §§ 5170, 5191. 
 249 Id. § 5191(a). 
 250 Id. § 5191(b).  Such an emergency was declared by President Clinton after the 
bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City in 1995.  See 
Letter from Bill Clinton, President, to James Lee Witt, FEMA Dir. on Disaster 
Assistance to Okla. City (Apr. 19, 1995) (http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getpage.cgi?dbname=1995_public_papers_vol1_misc&page=553&position=all). 
 251 42 U.S.C. § 5151. 
 252 Id. § 5151(a). 
 253 Id. § 5151(b). 
 254 Farber, supra note 80, at 310-11. 
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planning for individuals with disabilities.255  More specifically, the 
Coordinator is tasked with the following duties:  (1) interact with 
relevant government agencies regarding the needs of the disabled; (2) 
consult with organizations representing the interests of the disabled; 
(3) disseminate best practices and model evacuation plans; (4) 
develop training material concerning the needs of individuals with 
disabilities in a disaster; (5) promote accessibility of communication 
mechanisms, such as telephone hotlines, television and other 
programming, and websites with information about disaster relief; (6) 
ensure that accessible transportation is available for the disabled; and 
(7) work to ensure that appropriate post-event residence and 
relocation options are available for those with disabilities.256  The law 
is detailed and provides considerable guidance for the responsible 
official as to first steps that should be taken to protect the disabled 
community in case of disaster.  It does not, however, cover any at-risk 
groups other than the disabled.  The Act does not mandate any similar 
planning efforts for minorities, children, the impoverished, and others.  
Individuals with disabilities are also the subject of an executive 
order designed to provide them with additional protection.  On July 
22, 2004, President Bush issued Executive Order 13,347, entitled 
“Individuals with Disabilities in Emergency Preparedness,” which 
promotes consideration of the safety and security of the disabled 
during emergencies257 and establishes the Interagency Coordinating 
Council on Emergency Preparedness and Individuals with Disabilities 
in the Department of Homeland Security.258  The Department of 
Homeland Security also expressed concern about individuals with 
disabilities in 2006 and issued a report finding that they were 
inadequately integrated into emergency readiness plans.259 
 255 6 U.S.C. § 321b(a) (2006); Press Release, FEMA, Cindy Daniel Named FEMA’s 
Disability Coordinator (June 21, 2007) (http://www.fema.gov/news/newsrelease.fema? 
id=37220).  
 256 6 U.S.C. § 321b(a). 
 257 Exec. Order No. 13,347, 69 Fed. Reg. 44,573 (July 22, 2004), available at 
http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/cfr_2005/janqtr/pdf/3CFR13347.pdf.  
 258 Id.; see INTERAGENCY COORDINATING COUNCIL ON EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND 
INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., INDIVIDUALS WITH 
DISABILITIES IN EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EXECUTIVE ORDER 13347:  PROGRESS REPORT 
JULY 2005 – SEPTEMBER 2006, at 6, available at http://www.disabilitypreparedness.gov/ 
pdf/icc_0506_progress.pdf (last visited Apr. 10, 2009) (reporting on preparedness 
progress achieved through Council’s efforts). 
 259 U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., NATIONWIDE PLAN REVIEW PHASE 2 REPORT 41, 46-47 
(2006), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/Prep_NationwidePlanReview.pdf.  
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The Department of Justice (“DOJ”) has similarly stepped in to 
provide government agencies with guidance as to emergency 
preparedness for the disabled.  In the same year that President Bush 
signed his executive order, the DOJ issued guidance for local 
governments entitled “Making Community Emergency Preparedness 
and Response Programs Accessible to People with Disabilities.”260  
That document urged governmental entities to include individuals 
with disabilities in planning efforts.261  It also suggested the 
establishment of a voluntary and adequately confidential registry of 
people with disabilities so that local officials can provide individual 
assistance to those in need.262  In particular, it emphasized planning 
requirements in the following areas that impact people with 
disabilities:  (1) methods of communication must include both visual 
messages and audio announcements so that they are usable by people 
with visual and hearing impairments; (2) evacuation plans should be 
designed to accommodate individuals with mobility, vision, hearing, 
cognitive, and mental health impairments; (3) planners should 
identify all accessible modes of transportation, such as lift-equipped 
buses, that could be available during an emergency; (4) shelters must 
be fully accessible, staffed with individuals who are educated about the 
special needs of individuals with disabilities (e.g., mobility assistance, 
help dressing, and communication), equipped with refrigeration, 
back-up power, and other necessities for people who need medication 
or assistive devices (e.g., wheel chairs), and willing to house service 
animals even if pets are generally disallowed; and (5) facilities and 
trailers that will temporarily house individuals with disabilities must 
be accessible and appropriately equipped.263 
2. State Law 
All states have their own emergency laws, which enable governors 
or other state authorities to declare state emergencies.264  A 
 260 U.S. Department of Justice, An ADA Guide for Local Governments:  Making 
Community Emergency Preparedness and Response Programs Accessible to People 
with Disabilities, http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/ada/emergencyprepguide.htm (last visited 
Mar. 31, 2009). 
 261 Id.  
 262 Id.  
 263 Id. 
 264 HEALTH RESOURCES & SERVS. ADMIN., DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 
EMERGENCY SYSTEM FOR ADVANCE REGISTRATION OF VOLUNTEER HEALTH PROFESSIONALS 
(ESAR-VHP) — LEGAL AND REGULATORY ISSUES 24 (2006), available at 
ftp://ftp.hrsa.gov/bioterror/May_06_Legal_Report.pdf [hereinafter ESAR-VHP].  For a 
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comprehensive review of state emergency statutes reveals that some 
contain provisions focusing on vulnerable populations, though these 
statutes vary widely in scope and content.  However, emergency 
statutes in over half the states contain no reference to vulnerable 
populations.265 
A few states have adopted antidiscrimination provisions that apply 
specifically to disaster relief activities.266  These protect vulnerable 
populations by prohibiting discrimination based on race, color, 
religion, sex, age, national origin, ancestry, and economic status, and 
they prohibit discrimination by individuals or entities furnishing 
disaster relief services.267 
Some states have taken steps to ensure that the disabled are 
specifically considered in the course of emergency planning efforts.  A 
number of state provisions instruct in relatively general terms that 
planning initiatives should be undertaken.268  Several states provide for 
the appointment of state officials with responsibility for individuals 
with disabilities.269  Three states have established registries of disabled 
people.270  Individuals are encouraged to register prior to disasters so 
that they can more easily receive assistance.271  Other states specifically 
address the need for accessible shelters,272 telecommunication,273 
list of state laws and their definitions of “emergency” or “disaster,” see id. at 79-89 
app. B. 
 265 See infra notes 266-79 and accompanying text (describing existing statutory 
provisions). 
 266 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 28-15 (West 2003); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 166A-12 
(West 2007); UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-8a-501(1) (West 2007) (prohibiting 
discrimination only in provision of emergency medical services). 
 267 See sources cited supra note 266. 
 268 ALA. CODE § 31-9B-3 (LexisNexis 2006); CAL. GOV’T CODE § 8589.6 (West 
2005); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 252.356 (West Supp. 2008); MD. CODE ANN. STATE GOV’T § 9-
2403 (West 2004) (focusing only on deaf and hard of hearing); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 
22(2)(b)(12) (West Supp. 2008).  
 269 CAL. GOV’T CODE § 8588.15 (West Supp. 2008); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 30-15-6 (Supp. 
2007); Press Release, Agency for Persons with Disabilities, Florida Officials Announce 
Chip Wilson as Statewide Disability Coordinator (Nov. 5, 2007) (http:// 
www.apd.myflorida.com/news/2007/statewide-disability-coordinator-announced.htm). 
 270 CAL. GOV’T CODE § 8589.6(b)(2); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 252.355 (West Supp. 2008); 
N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 23-a (West 2002); see also New Jersey Office of Emergency 
Management, Now’s the Time to Get “Hurricane Ready” and Sign Up for NJ’s Special 
Needs Registry for Disasters, http://www.capemaycountygov.net/Cit-e-Access/ 
webpage.cfm?TID=5&TPID=9194 (indicating that six New Jersey counties have 
created voluntary, special needs registries for people with disabilities that will be used 
during disasters). 
 271 See sources cited supra note 270. 
 272 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 252.385(2)(b) (West Supp. 2008). 
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informational materials and educational outreach,274 or for evacuation 
plans designed to accommodate individuals with disabilities.275   
Finally, some states also address disaster relief planning for other 
vulnerable populations.  Connecticut focuses on inmates of state 
institutions and children in schools.276  Other states focus on welfare 
recipients or low-income residents,277 elderly people,278 and 
individuals with limited English language proficiency.279 
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR AMENDING EXISTING LAW TO IMPROVE 
ASSISTANCE FOR VULNERABLE POPULATIONS IN DISASTERS 
Successful response efforts are dependent upon effective planning 
and preparedness initiatives.  The question of how best to plan for the 
needs of various vulnerable groups during disasters is not new.  Many 
experts have given the matter considerable thought and delineated 
 273 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 28-24(a)(1), -25b(b) (West Supp. 2008); OR. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 401.773 (West 2007). 
 274 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 252.35(2)(a),(i)-(j) (West Supp. 2008); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 37-B, § 704 (Supp. 2007); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 6701 (West 2004). 
 275 430 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 130/1 to /125 (West 2004) (requiring owners of high 
rise buildings to plan for evacuation of disabled occupants during disaster and make 
their plans available to police); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 401.272 (West 2007) (providing 
that Office of Emergency Management shall develop plan for safely evacuating service 
animals and people who use them, with emphasis on protecting human life). 
 276 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 28-9(e) (West Supp. 2008) (“The governor shall take 
appropriate measures for protecting the health and safety of inmates of state 
institutions and children in schools.”). 
 277 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 31, § 521 (1997) (directing state to provide funding for 
welfare-receiving households in disasters, including emergency shelter, mortgage or 
rent assistance, and other costs relating to self-sufficiency of household); D.C. CODE 
ANN. § 7-2231.08 (LexisNexis 2008) (“The Agency shall also pay particular attention 
to the needs of senior citizens and low-income residents in establishing an effective 
homeland security public warning and information capability.”); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 22, § 3761 (2004) (allowing state to provide assistance to needy families with 
children who are deprived of basic necessities because of emergency); N.Y. EXEC. LAW 
§ 22(2)(b)(12) (West Supp. 2008) (stating state disaster plan should pay particular 
attention to needs of poor). 
 278 D.C. CODE ANN. § 7-2231.08 (LexisNexis 2008) (requiring special attention to 
needs of senior citizens); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 37-B, § 704 (addressing provision of 
educational material to elderly); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 22(2)(b)(12) (West Supp. 2008) 
(recommending state disaster plan to pay particular attention to needs of elderly). 
 279 CAL. GOV’T CODE § 8589.6(b)(2) (West 2005) (establishing registries for those 
with English language deficiencies and elderly persons); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 
252.35(2)(j) (requiring establishment of educational outreach program); ME. REV. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 37-B, § 704  (addressing provision of educational material to this 
population). 
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careful suggestions.280  However, thus far, specific planning guidelines 
have generally not been adopted as legal requirements that are 
bolstered by political accountability and enforcement mechanisms.  
This Part analyzes the shortcoming of American law insofar as it 
addresses the needs of vulnerable populations in disasters.  It then 
develops recommendations to address the current gaps and 
shortcomings of the law.  It is only with educated, sensitive, and 
responsible planning that we can avoid repeating the many failures 
that the disadvantaged have suffered in past disasters. 
A. Where Existing Law Falls Short 
While numerous legal provisions establish equality and 
nondiscrimination mandates as well as affirmative duties towards 
vulnerable populations, these laws are insufficient to protect the needs 
of the vulnerable during disasters.  In principle, these mandates and 
duties apply both in ordinary times and during emergencies.281  As 
discussed in Part III, these include the Equal Protection Clause, the 
Eighth Amendment, the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, Title VI of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, and state constitutional equal protection 
provisions, disability laws, and civil rights statutes.282  With all these 
laws in place, it might be tempting to argue that vulnerable 
populations already have adequate legal protections.  Unfortunately, 
the difficulty litigants have in vindicating their rights under current 
law283 necessitates more rigorous protection. 
Relying on litigation as the primary safeguard for the rights of the 
disadvantaged raises at least four significant concerns.  First, those 
who die or are permanently disabled as a result of emergency 
responders’ acts or omissions can never be made whole, even if they 
are able to prove liability.  Second, various sources of immunity 
protect governmental actors, volunteers, and others from liability 
related to disaster response activities.284  Third, juries might believe 
that under chaotic, exigent circumstances, responders performed as 
well as possible, that response shortcomings must be forgiven, and 
that inequities were inevitable.  Fourth, the disadvantaged might not 
be able to afford to litigate claims to vindicate their rights.  
 280 See infra Part IV.B (discussing recommendations offered by preparedness experts). 
 281 See supra Part III.A. 
 282 See supra Part III.A. 
 283 See supra Part III. 
 284 See Hoffman, supra note 236, at 1937-54; supra notes 155-61 and accompanying 
text. 
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Consequently, litigation is unlikely to provide adequate relief to 
aggrieved parties in the aftermath of a disaster. 
In light of these limitations, some legislatures have recognized that 
appropriate planning is of critical importance to the disadvantaged.  
These legislatures realize that prospectively preventing harm to the 
vulnerable is vastly superior to relying on a retroactive remedial 
system.  As a result, a limited number of relevant federal and state 
preparedness provisions have been enacted.285  Unfortunately, they fall 
far short of providing a comprehensive protection scheme. 
The federal and state laws constitute a patchwork of legislation that 
leaves many gaps and unanswered questions.  For example, the Pandemic 
and All-Hazards Preparedness Act (“PAHPA”) allows for the optional 
appointment of a “Director of At-Risk Individuals” in the Department of 
Health and Human Services but does not require this appointment.286  It 
also provides no guidance as to how this official is to achieve 
preparedness goals.287  The Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform 
Act of 2006 mandates that FEMA must have a Disability Coordinator but 
does not address preparedness for any other vulnerable population.288  
Moreover, state protections vary widely.  While some states require a 
limited number of emergency planning initiatives for vulnerable 
populations,289 other states ignore the topic of emergency preparedness 
for the disadvantaged altogether.290  No state provides a comprehensive 
preparedness approach. 
Existing laws do not consistently designate officials who will be 
responsible for emergency preparedness for the disadvantaged and 
who will be publicly accountable in case of failures.  Nor do the 
statutes provide extensive, detailed guidance as to what steps should 
be taken to address the needs of vulnerable populations in disasters.  
Without mechanisms to ensure accountability and without specific 
requirements, appropriate preparedness is unlikely to be 
accomplished.  In the absence of strong statutory mandates, vulnerable 
populations, who often have weak political voices,291 may not 
represent a priority for emergency planners.  Consequently, further 
legislative intervention is needed. 
 285 See supra Part III.B. 
 286 42 U.S.C. § 300hh-16 (2006). 
 287 Id. 
 288 6 U.S.C. § 321b(a) (2006). 
 289 See supra Part III.B.2. 
 290 See supra Part III.B.2. 
 291 Law & Ensminger, supra note 25, at 81. 
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B. Specific Recommendations 
A critically important mechanism for the promotion of the interests 
of disadvantaged communities is federal and state emergency response 
legislation.  Both federal and state laws addressing emergency 
preparedness for vulnerable populations should be revised and 
strengthened to maximize disaster readiness.  The suggested legal 
interventions are designed to bolster accountability and ensure that 
specific tasks are undertaken to promote the interests of the 
disadvantaged during disasters. 
1. Enhancing Accountability 
Federal and state statutes should require the designation of officials 
with specific responsibility for vulnerable groups in emergencies.  
Government officials who are required by law to engage in various 
planning activities are likely to be motivated to achieve preparedness 
goals because they will be judged based on their performance.  
Administrations that fail in their planning and response efforts may 
suffer serious political consequences, and individual officials may lose 
their jobs, as was the case after Hurricane Katrina.292 
Federal law should thus provide for greater accountability.  
Congress should amend PAHPA to require the appointment of a 
Director of At-Risk Individuals rather than leaving such an 
appointment to the discretion of the Health and Human Services 
Secretary.293  Following the example of the Post-Katrina Emergency 
Management Reform Act of 2006, PAHPA or associated federal 
regulations should also develop more detailed requirements as to the 
tasks that the Director must accomplish.294  Under PAHPA, the 
Secretary was obligated to submit a report to Congress concerning 
preparedness progress by December 19, 2007.295  Such reports should 
be required on an annual basis and should be publicly available. 
PAHPA, however, is not the only federal law that must be amended 
in order to provide comprehensive protection to vulnerable 
 292 Christine Hauser, Three Days After Losing Katrina Duties, FEMA Chief Resigns 
Post, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/12/national/ 
nationalspecial/12cnd-fema.html. 
 293 42 U.S.C. § 300hh-16 (2006). 
 294 See supra notes 255-56 and accompanying text; see also infra Part IV.B.2 for 
suggestions as to specific requirements. 
 295 42 U.S.C. § 300hh-16(8); DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., PANDEMIC AND ALL 
HAZARDS PREPAREDNESS ACT PROGRESS REPORT 14-16 (2007), available at 
http://www.hhs.gov/aspr/conference/pahpa/2007/pahpa-progress-report-102907.pdf.  
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populations in disasters.  The Act governs only one type of disaster — 
public health emergencies.296  It is important that federal legislation 
require preparedness planning for a wide range of federally declared 
disasters.297  Congress should therefore amend the more broadly 
applicable Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act as well.298  
The statutorily established position of FEMA Disability Coordinator299 
should be expanded to encompass coordination of emergency 
preparedness for all vulnerable populations and not solely for 
individuals with disabilities.300  The statute should include a detailed 
list of tasks that addresses not only the needs of individuals with 
disabilities,301 but also those of other vulnerable populations,302 and 
should require publicly available annual progress reports. 
The state emergency statutes should also require the appointment of 
officials with specific responsibility for at-risk groups, because not all 
emergencies will be declared at the federal level.303  Furthermore, the 
activities of state and local responders may reach more individuals 
than the assistance of federal authorities.  Designated state officials 
with explicit responsibility for vulnerable populations will be 
accountable if they fail to perform their assigned duties and could 
suffer job loss or political backlash.  However, in order to be effective, 
offices in charge of planning for at-risk populations would need to be 
well funded and staffed, and thus, legislation must provide for 
adequate financial appropriations. 
2. Detailed Planning Guidance 
The federal and state emergency laws that address disaster 
readiness for vulnerable populations should provide detailed 
requirements to guide the work of the designated governmental 
authorities, whom I will call vulnerable populations coordinators 
(“VPCs”).  The Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act’s 
 296 42 U.S.C. § 247d(a) (2006). 
 297 See supra notes 248-50 and accompanying text (discussing Stafford Act, which 
authorizes President to declare national emergencies that are not public health 
emergencies). 
 298 6 U.S.C. § 321b(a) (2006). 
 299 Id. 
 300 Id. 
 301 See id. 
 302 See infra Part IV.B.2 for suggested requirements. 
 303 ESAR-VHP, supra note 264, at 24.  For a list of state laws and their definitions 
of “emergency” or “disaster,” see id. at 79-89 app. B. 
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list of duties304 and DOJ guidance305 can serve as a strong foundation 
for statutory requirements regarding individuals with disabilities.  
For recommendations concerning other vulnerable groups, 
legislators can turn to existing state emergency laws306 and proposals 
formulated by experts in the field. 
General guidance can be drawn from the report of a panel of twenty-
four experts from eleven countries who met in Bellagio, Italy, in July 
2006.307  They were tasked with formulating recommendations to 
mitigate and prevent unjust outcomes for the world’s disadvantaged in 
the event of a pandemic influenza outbreak.308  The experts, who 
became known as the “Bellagio Group,” created a “Checklist for 
Pandemic Influenza Preparedness and Response Plans” consisting of 
three action items for emergency planners:  (1) identify traditionally 
disadvantaged populations and those likely to be disproportionately 
harmed by a pandemic; (2) involve these groups in planning 
initiatives; and (3) identify and address the needs of vulnerable 
populations likely to arise from a pandemic.309   
Many advocates and scholars have applied similar criteria to 
formulate more detailed recommendations for vulnerable groups.  For 
example, experts have stressed the importance of obtaining input 
directly from affected communities.310  Federal and state officials 
should be statutorily required to consult with representatives of the 
various vulnerable populations because these individuals may be in 
the best position to assess and articulate their needs.311  
Representatives could be chosen from among the leadership of major 
advocacy organizations, such as the National Council on Disability 
and the AARP. 
 304 6 U.S.C. § 321b(b) (2006). 
 305 See supra notes 260-63 and accompanying text. 
 306 See supra Part III.B.2. 
 307 Uscher-Pines et al., supra note 6, at 33. 
 308 Id. 
 309 Id. 
 310 Andrulis et al., supra note 1, at 1274 (reporting that some state and local 
government agencies have also involved minority groups in discussions concerning 
how best to communicate with and serve particular communities in emergencies); 
Uscher-Pines et al., supra note 6, at 33. 
 311 See 6 U.S.C. § 321b(b)(3) (2006) (requiring Disability Coordinator to consult 
“with organizations that represent the interests and rights of individuals with 
disabilities about the needs of individuals with disabilities in emergency planning 
requirements and relief efforts”).  In the case of children, undocumented persons, and 
prisoners, it will most likely be necessary to rely upon advocates who represent their 
interests rather than members of these populations themselves. 
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Statutes should also obligate VPCs to ensure that modes of 
communication, educational materials, shelters, transportation, 
medical supplies, and other resources are accessible to disabled, 
elderly, or impoverished individuals, children, those who are not 
proficient in English, and others who are disadvantaged.312  More 
specifically, with respect to children, the statutes should list the 
following goals, recommended by the Institute of Medicine:  (1) 
establish protocols to minimize separations between parents and 
children and expedite reunions in case of unavoidable separations; (2) 
improve pediatric expertise among health care providers involved in 
emergency response activities; (3) develop pediatric surge capacities; 
(4) supply social, medical, and mental health services that are 
appropriate for children; and (5) at least every two years conduct 
disaster drills that include a hypothetical pediatric mass casualty 
event.313  In addition, to protect elderly and disabled individuals with 
limited mobility, the statutes should require support for homebound 
individuals and the provision of home health care services, to the 
extent possible.314 
VPCs should also be required to safeguard the welfare of ethnic 
minorities and those with language barriers through specific measures.  
These include the following steps:  (1) promoting culturally sensitive, 
accurate, and easily understood translation of written and verbal 
communication; (2) increasing use of technology, such as audio and 
video tools for those with poor reading comprehension; (3) 
conducting tabletop training exercises geared towards minority 
communities that address issues such as distrust of governmental 
authorities,315 availability of translators, and other culturally relevant 
issues; and (4) creating centralized information resources that enable 
agencies and organizations serving minorities to access appropriate 
materials and experts.316 
 312 Id. § 321b(b) (requiring FEMA Disability Coordinator to promote accessibility 
of communication mechanisms, transportation, and temporary housing). 
 313 INST. OF MED., supra note 16, at 239. 
 314 Aldrich & Benson, supra note 50, at 3. 
 315 Some individuals may distrust government authorities based on their personal 
experiences or their identification with a group that has been historically oppressed.  
African Americans, for example, may distrust government-provided medical services 
because of a long history of abuses, including the Tuskegee syphilis trial.  See Sharona 
Hoffman, “Racially-Tailored” Medicine Unraveled, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 395, 426-27 
(2005).  Illegal aliens may distrust offers of government assistance in disasters because 
they fear being prosecuted for immigration violations.  See supra notes 93-94 and 
accompanying text.  
 316 Andrulis et al., supra note 1, at 1275-77. 
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The vulnerable populations for which VPCs are responsible should 
include prisoners.  The VPCs should oversee efforts to develop plans 
for the efficient and safe evacuation of prisons and jails,317 ensuring 
that prison authorities conduct disaster drills, coordinate across 
departmental lines, and have designated facilities that can receive 
evacuees who are inmates.318 
Emergency statutes should also address the creation of voluntary 
registries to store information about those who are most likely to be 
isolated and to lack mobility and communication modes during an 
emergency.  These include individuals with disabilities,319 elderly persons, 
and those with English language barriers.320  Registries would allow 
responders to locate those with special needs and would facilitate efforts 
to reach them for purposes of evacuation or delivery of information and 
supplies.  Both local authorities and advocacy organizations should 
educate at-risk communities about the registries and encourage 
individuals to provide the necessary information.  Although data would 
be accessible to authorized individuals during emergencies, registry 
operators would need to implement safeguards so that confidentiality is 
maintained.  Vulnerable people are unlikely to register if they believe that 
their identities, medical conditions, and contact information might be 
sold to marketers or disclosed to other third parties.   
Widespread use of electronic health record systems would 
significantly enhance the efficacy of registries, enabling optimal 
treatment of victims once they are located.321  These systems would 
prevent medical records from being lost, allow responders to locate 
critical information through electronic searches, alert clinicians to 
patients’ medical histories, allergies, or drug lists, and facilitate 
treatment in many other ways.322 
 317 See AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 75, at 10-11. 
 318 Id. at 11; see also DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES 
PANDEMIC INFLUENZA PLANNING CHECKLIST 1-8 (2007), available at 
http://www.pandemicflu.gov/plan/workplaceplanning/correctionchecklist.pdf. 
 319 New Jersey Office of Emergency Management, supra note 270 (reporting that 
six New Jersey counties have created voluntary, special needs registry for people with 
disabilities that will be used during disasters). 
 320 See supra notes 270 and 279 and accompanying text (discussing states that have 
already established registries).   
 321 See Sharona Hoffman & Andy Podgurski, Finding a Cure:  The Case for 
Regulation and Oversight of Electronic Health Record Systems, 22 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 
103, 112-19 (2008) (discussing benefits of EHR systems). 
 322 Id.; see also Robert Steinbrook, Health Care and the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act, 360 N. ENGL. J. MED. 1057, 1057 (2009) (explaining that President 
Obama’s stimulus legislation, The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, 
provides “$19.2 billion for health information technology.”). 
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It should be noted that government agencies may contract with 
private parties for the delivery of some services, such as transportation 
or distribution of medical supplies, to the public.  The relevant 
statutory provisions should require that in such cases, contracts 
between the state and private parties obligate the provider of services 
to plan for and be prepared to address the needs of vulnerable 
populations.323  Failure to plan appropriately would constitute breach 
of contract that would be actionable by the state government. 
Moreover, all state emergency response laws should contain explicit 
nondiscrimination mandates.324  Following the Stafford Act’s 
precedent,325 all states should include provisions that prohibit 
discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, age, national origin, 
ancestry, economic status, or disability326 in the provision of state-
sponsored disaster assistance.  Responders and recipients of aid who are 
found to violate these provisions would be deemed to have breached 
their disaster relief contracts with the state or forfeit state funding.327 
These recommendations do not demand the creation of new private 
causes of action for aggrieved individuals beyond those that already 
exist.328  As argued in previous work, liability for response activities 
can have the adverse effect of discouraging participation in emergency 
operations329 and therefore must be approached with great caution by 
legislators.  Even without the threat of new causes of action, the 
proposed statutory provisions should galvanize politically accountable 
emergency planners and focus their attention on the fate of the 
disadvantaged.   
The recommended requirements would follow a long-established 
tradition in American law and policy of both prohibiting 
discrimination against the vulnerable and devoting significant and 
often disproportionate resources to promoting the welfare of the 
 323 See ALA. CODE § 31-9B-3 (LexisNexis Supp. 2007) (requiring that state agencies 
include emergency planning requirements in contracts for care of disabled). 
 324 See supra notes 266-67 and accompanying text (discussing states that already 
have such provisions). 
 325 42 U.S.C. § 5151(a) (2000). 
 326 These laws could incorporate by reference existing state laws that prohibit 
discrimination based on various classifications and emphasize that the mandates apply 
even during emergencies.  For example, all states have laws that prohibit disability-
based discrimination.  See supra note 228.  
 327 See 42 U.S.C. § 5151 (deeming compliance with Stafford Act’s anti-
discrimination mandate to be “a condition of participation in the distribution of 
assistance or supplies under this chapter or of receiving assistance”). 
 328 See supra Part III. 
 329 Hoffman, supra note 236, at 1917, 1955-56. 
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disadvantaged.  These commitments are manifested in constitutional 
provisions, including the Equal Protection Clause and the Eighth 
Amendment, disability laws such as the ADA and IDEA, public 
programs such as Medicaid and SCHIP,330 and a limited number of 
existing federal and state emergency laws.331  The suggested approach, 
consequently, is not unprecedented and should be embraced by the 
government and American public. 
CONCLUSION 
It is clear that during emergencies vulnerable populations will have 
special needs and require particular attention.332  However, despite 
significant investment of resources in emergency preparedness at the 
federal and state levels,333 progress for special needs groups remains 
slow, and many have identified severe planning and readiness gaps in 
this area.334  For these populations, emergency response failures can 
have catastrophic consequences, including loss of the ability to work or 
live independently, permanent injury, and death.335  As the Hurricane 
Katrina experience made clear, preparedness fiascos will result in 
humiliation and a loss of public faith in the government as well.336 
In the context of emergencies, vulnerable populations include a 
large spectrum of groups:  individuals with physical and mental 
impairments, elderly persons, those with language barriers, children, 
pregnant women, the impoverished, certain ethnic minorities, 
undocumented persons, and prisoners.337  Some segment of each of 
these populations is likely to require acute attention.  While 
individuals with disabilities have drawn some attention in 
preparedness circles,338 other vulnerable populations have been all but 
ignored.339 
 330 See supra notes 134-41; Part III. 
 331 See supra Part III.B. 
 332 See supra Part I. 
 333 See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text. 
 334 CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, KEY FINDINGS FROM PUBLIC HEALTH 
PREPAREDNESS:  MOBILIZING STATE BY STATE 5 (2008), available at http://www.bt.cdc.gov/ 
publications/feb08phprep/pdf/feb08phpkeyfindings.pdf (focusing on preparedness 
challenges); Gostin, supra note 127, at 3 (arguing that current influenza plans fail to 
address special needs of vulnerable groups). 
 335 See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text. 
 336 See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
 337 See supra Part I. 
 338 See supra notes 255-63 and accompanying text. 
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This Article has argued that vulnerable populations will enjoy 
meaningful protection only if emergency plans and preparedness 
initiatives anticipate and address their needs.  Without appropriate 
planning, response efforts are unlikely to be adequate for at-risk 
communities.  A robust legal framework already requires that the 
welfare of vulnerable groups be safeguarded.  These are federal and 
state disability rights laws, the Equal Protection Clause, Title VI of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 and equivalent state laws, the Eighth 
Amendment, PAHPA, the Stafford Act, and various state laws.340  
Emergency planners and responders operating at the pre-event, event, 
and recovery phases should bear in mind the mandates and spirit of 
these legal provisions.  These laws establish a commitment to eschew 
discrimination against vulnerable populations and require that 
affirmative steps be taken to safeguard the welfare of the 
disadvantaged.  In addition, several distributive justice theories justify 
allocation of scarce resources to members of vulnerable populations 
even if they require more intensive care or disproportionately large 
resource investments when compared to others.341  It is also important 
to emphasize that disaster readiness for vulnerable populations goes 
hand in hand with preparedness for the general population.  If those 
without special needs are well equipped to react appropriately and 
care for themselves during emergencies, the vulnerable are more likely 
to enjoy good outcomes because more resources will be available to 
serve those who require extra assistance. 
Nevertheless, a careful critique reveals that existing mandates are 
insufficient to protect the welfare of at-risk groups during disasters.  
Consequently, this Article has formulated detailed recommendations for 
revision and improvement of federal and state emergency laws so that 
they more effectively promote the interests of those in greatest need. 
The recommendations and guidelines reviewed in this Article 
demonstrate that much can be done to anticipate and address the 
needs of the vulnerable during catastrophic events.  Adequate 
planning will go far to minimize the extent to which these groups 
suffer disproportionately and experience devastating outcomes.  
Responsible emergency preparedness and response efforts are critical 
to preventing disasters from ending or ravaging the lives of society’s 
disadvantaged members. 
preparedness plans address needs of disadvantaged groups). 
 340 See supra Part III. 
 341 See supra Part II. 
